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Abstract

The Leibniz ScienceCampus “Eastern Europe – Global Area” (EEGA) is an overall integrative platform and collaborative research network that focuses on the development of new research perspectives on Eastern Europe’s changing role in current and historical processes of globalization. Together with partners from the region, the EEGA explores processes such as migration and mobility, economic networks and political integration, as well as intercultural perspectives and identities. At the heart of this research is the question as to how Eastern European societies are positioning themselves in and towards global processes and conflicts.

In the framework of the Leibniz ScienceCampus and in close cooperation with the e-journal “Connections”, an open access working paper series has been developed. The first special issue of this “EEGA@Connections” series is an edited volume by Dr Alexander Yendell, Leipzig University (Germany). It focuses on understanding islamophobia in Eastern Europe.

The so-called “refugee crisis” has made clear that Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments are common in some Eastern European countries and even lead to political demands that are incompatible with the democratic requirement of religious freedom and EU anti-discrimination rules. With the increasing migration of Muslims against the background of globalization and conflicts in the Middle East, the increasing religious plurality and at the same time the threat perceived by parts of the Christian or non-religious majority population, the peaceful co-existence of people of different cultures and religions is in danger. This is particularly evident in the rise of right-wing populist movements and parties in Western and European democracies over the past few years, who have openly expressed their Islamophobic attitudes within their political programs and speeches. Also, population surveys reveal that the majority of populations in European countries are at least sceptical of Islam or even Islamophobic. Against this background the Special Issue on “Understanding and explaining Islamophobia in Eastern Europe” discusses the following three questions:

1) What forms and manifestations of Islamophobia exist in Eastern European countries at the level of attitudes, behaviors, media and political contexts?

2) How has Islamophobia developed historically in Eastern Europe?

3) Which theories at the micro-, meso- and macro-social level explain Islamophobia in Eastern Europe?

The articles offer general theoretical and cross-national and comparative perspectives as well as case-specific views. It is a multidisciplinary discussion as the authors come from different disciplines or use theories which were developed in various disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, political science anthropology and history.
01 Understanding and Explaining Islamophobia in Eastern Europe

Alexander Yendell (Leipzig University, Germany)
Understanding and Explaining Islamophobia in Eastern Europe

Alexander Yendell (Leipzig University, Germany)

The so-called “refugee crisis” has made clear that negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are very common in some Eastern European countries and even lead to political demands that are incompatible with the democratic requirement of religious freedom and with EU anti-discrimination laws. With the increasing number of Muslims migrating against the background of globalization and conflicts in the Middle East, and the threat perceived by the Christian or non-religious majority population, the peaceful coexistence of people of different cultures and religions is under threat. This is particularly evident in the rise of right-wing populist movements and parties in Western and European democracies over the past few years, which have openly expressed their Islamophobic attitudes in their political programmes and speeches.

There are quite a few examples that show the extent of Islamophobia in Eastern European countries. In Hungary, the rejection of Islam and Muslim immigrants is expressed loudly. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is against having people from different cultures in his country and obviously means Muslims. The Czech President Miloš Zeman is even clearer, saying that he does not want Muslims to migrate to his country. Poland only wants to accept Christian refugees into the country; in addition, there are reports of attacks on Islamic institutions. Furthermore, the far-right Polish party PiS is accused of uniting with right-wing extremist groups and highly-ranked representatives of the Catholic Church to demonstrate against Muslims. The extent of Islamophobia in Eastern Europe is also illustrated by population surveys. The results of some quantitative surveys on attitudes towards Islam and Muslims (even before the so-called refugee crisis) show that Islamophobia is widespread among the population of some Eastern European countries [1], even though the proportion of Muslims in the population is significantly lower than in Western European countries.

A look at social media such as Facebook reveals that anti-Islamic sites are very popular in Eastern European countries. That is why it is no surprise that not only right-wing extremist parties, but also other nationalist and openly Islamophobic movements are experiencing a boom through the perceived threat of Islam, both in their core programme and as part of their general xenophobic orientation [2].

Although there have been many media reports on Islamophobia in Eastern Europe, we actually do not know much about the manifestations of Islamophobia in the population of Eastern European countries. There is still a considerable research gap in terms both of our knowledge of universal theories and of empirically robust material from quantitative and qualitative social research.

The explanations of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment often refer to socio-psychological theories which already have a long tradition in prejudice research and a relatively high level of explanatory power. One prominent theory is, for example, the deprivation thesis, which sees a connection between objective or subjectively perceived economic disadvantage and the devaluation of strangers. This devaluation of strangers comes to the fore particularly in times of economic recession or financial crises. Most scholars following the deprivation thesis argue that, in the battle for scarce resources, members of the majority society tend to derogate competing immigrants [3]. It seems plausible in this context that people in East European countries with a socialist history are dissatisfied with the economic situation especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The crisis had a massive impact on Eastern and South East European economies, which were not prepared for a recession or credit shortage, and it seems plausible that, in this context, there has been a rise in the level of anxiety that people feel with regard to potential migrants and competitors on the job market.
Another relevant theory is the contact hypothesis, which claims that individual personal contact with members of an outgroup may reduce stereotypes [4]. A few studies on Islamophobia show that contacts with Muslims reduce negative attitudes towards them [5]. The classical contact hypothesis is broadened by the parasocial contact hypothesis [6], which postulates that mass media such as radio, television and films can create the illusion in people that they have direct contact, and can therefore influence the attitudes that people have towards a social group that is perceived as foreign or strange. There is a strong “bad news” bias especially regarding Islam, as the media concentrates on reports of terrorist attacks by Islamists [7]. Indirect contacts with Islam are assumed to be mainly negative and they can lead to stereotyping, especially if direct contacts with Muslims are infrequent. In contrast, direct contacts with Muslims could mitigate the negative bias against Islam and Muslims. One explanation for Islamophobia in Eastern Europe could therefore also be the lack of contact with Muslims. In most Eastern European countries, the number of Muslims is negligible. Many Eastern Europeans probably do not know Muslims personally, and instead base their opinion on news of Islamist terrorism.

The concept of the authoritarian personality [8] is also often used to explain Islamophobia. The authoritarian personality is believed to be a state of mind or attitude in which a person shows absolute obedience or submission to authority, while oppressing his or her subordinates. It usually applies to individuals who are known or viewed as having an authoritative, strict, or oppressive personality towards subordinates. The authoritarian person cannot live his or her own life, and therefore hates the lives of others (see Decker et al. 2016). It is conceivable that, since authoritarian structures played an important role before the fall of communism, Eastern Europe is now a breeding-ground for right-wing extremism and xenophobia.

Finally, intergroup theories investigate the division between “we” and the “others”. For example, Social Identity Theory [10] proposes that people identify with groups to increase their own self-esteem. These can be nations, cultures, religious communities, or football clubs. One way for people to increase their self-esteem may be to boost the significance of their ingroup by devaluing the significance of an outgroup. Ethnic identification could play a particular role in Eastern European countries, where ethnic origin is highly significant for the question of whether to accept other people; this is in contrast to countries with a longer tradition of immigration and naturalization, and with a more civic form of national identity [11]. Muslims who do not belong to a person’s own ethnic group are likely to be derogated as they do not have the opportunity to become fully respected members of the ingroup.

These are just a few examples of important theories that have proven to be useful in explaining Islamophobia. Statistical models that seek to verify such theories, however, show that there is usually a high level of residual variance, which means that we can actually only partially explain Islamophobic attitudes. Further explanations may then be historical, political and cultural.

Against this background, this Special Issue is designed to help answer three key research questions:

1) What forms and manifestations of Islamophobia are there in Eastern European countries at the level of attitudes, behaviours, the media, and political contexts?

2) How has Islamophobia developed historically in Eastern Europe?

3) Which theories at the micro, meso and macro social level can explain Islamophobia in Eastern Europe?

The articles in this Special Issue are the result of a workshop attended by scholars from Eastern Europe, Western Europe and North America that took place in Leipzig in November 2017.

The contributions are arranged in such a way, that a general theoretical and transnational/comparative perspective leads to a case-specific view. The first article emerged from the keynote by Ivan Kalmar, who argues that Islamophobia in Eastern Europe does not stem from a long Eastern European tradition, but qualitatively resembles Western European Islamophobia. The second article, by Farid Hafez, discusses Islamophobia in Eastern Europe as a form of racism. Hafez questions the claim that “Islamophobia without Muslims” is specific to Eastern Europe, and suggests instead that “Islamophobia without Muslims” reveals a fundamental essence that is present in every form of racism, and that is therefore true of Western Europe, too. Gert Pickel and Cemal Öztürk compare Islamophobic attitudes in Eastern European countries on the basis of data from population surveys, and test social-psychological theories in multivariate explanatory models. One of the most important findings of this analysis is that the lack of contacts with Muslims in Eastern Europe explains the high level of Islamophobia.
The remaining articles discuss Islamophobia in individual countries. David Herbert raises the question of whether prejudices against Muslims in the Russian Federation are based on Islamophobia or on an internalized racial hierarchy. He concludes that Muslims are not the group that suffers the highest level of prejudice in Russia, and that, in actual fact, ethnicity appears to trump religion as a marker of difference. Aaron Walter describes the situation in Slovakia and provides answers to the question as to the extent to which Islamophobia influenced the 2016 election, and to whether the level of Islamophobia in Slovakia expresses public feeling, or whether it is instead part of a larger sense of public discontentment. Walter reveals that the 2015 migration crisis influenced the Slovak parliamentary elections in 2016, and that post-truth politics in the context of Islamophobia influenced public discourse by appealing to emotions disconnected from policy details. He concludes that there are clear signs suggesting that Slovak public feeling is Islamophobic. Premysl Rosulek deals with the songs of some Czech singers who are derogatory towards Muslim immigrants in their songs. He describes the different ways that feelings of threat regarding the migration crisis are manifested, such as in the image of huge crowds of immigrants entering the country, the feared Islamicization of society, the need to mobilize at the European level, and the portrayal of a Syrian man as posing a threat to women. Finally, Konrad Pedziwiatr discusses the role of the church in Poland in the context of re-Christianization and the prevention of a perceived process of Islamicization. Pedziwiatr argues that the alliance between church and state in Poland continues to sacralize nation and state, and portrays migrants from Islamic countries as a key threat.

This Special Issue would not have been possible without support – both material and personal. I would therefore like to express my gratitude to the Leibniz Science Campus “Eastern Europe – Global Area”, which sponsored the workshop and made it possible for scholars from all over the world to come to Leipzig. Besides the speakers and authors, I owe special thanks to a number of people who helped and supported me: Raphael Brüne, Lena Dailywater, Sophie Herrmann, Matthias Middell, Katja Naumann, and Lea Wamsler. This Special Issue would not have been possible without them.

Notes
[2] E.g. in Poland, PEGIDA Poland, Polish Defence League, ONR; in the Czech Republic, Úsvit; in Romania, Noua Dreapta; in Croatia, Ustaše, etc.


Abstract
It is often asserted that Islamophobia is more common in Eastern than in Western Europe, with the reason given for this alleged Islamophobia being that Eastern Europe has a long tradition of intolerance (and particularly of antisemitism) and too short a history of coming to terms with this tradition. This article argues that this is a myth. Islamophobia in Eastern Europe is qualitatively the same as in Western Europe, but is quantitatively greater in many Eastern European countries than in many but not all Western European countries. The one striking difference is that Islamophobia has been more politically successful in the East of Europe than the West, at least initially – but this gap has perhaps been closed recently by the rise to power of unabashedly Islamophobic politicians in Austria and Italy (as in America). To understand the difference, we must focus on recent political relations between Western and Eastern Europe. Much of East European frustration is due to the way that communist rule was followed not by a meeting of East and West as equals, but by a Western political and economic takeover, including the largest transfer of public capital to private hands in history, which was applauded in the West. Too much emphasis on the past can serve to obscure this very contemporary fact.

Keywords
Islamophobia, antisemitism, populism, East-West relations, Russian influence, privatization, politics
Many East Europeans are dissatisfied. And there is a common conviction that they are dissatisfied because they do not understand liberal democracy; because they have not been able to shake off their dark authoritarian heritage. In this heritage, nothing is darker than the heavy baggage of antisemitism. The Islamophobia of East Europeans is — so the story goes — the result of their ancient, and continuing, antisemitism.

But attributing Islamophobia to culturally ingrained antisemitism is in effect to depoliticize the issue. It takes us away from understanding that the political advancement of Islamophobia is everywhere part and parcel of an illiberal, populist revolution: a revolt against the long advancement of neoliberal forms of globalism. “Washington” in America, “Brussels” in Europe; there are many differences but throughout the Euro-Atlantic world many ordinary people have turned away from their political, as well as their economic and cultural, elites, whom they now see as their oppressors. Eastern Europe is like everybody else, only more so. It behoves us to study why it is more so, without denying that it is also like everybody else.

I have written extensively in the past about the joint history of the Western Christian image of Muslims and Jews, and about Islamophobia and antisemitism. Since its appearance, Islam has been compared to Judaism, and Muslims have been compared to Jews. But the exact form taken by Islamophobia, antisemitism, as well as the relationship between the two, has varied greatly through various periods and sociopolitical contexts. The long durée trajectory has been outlined in such works as Orientalism and the Jews, which I co-edited with Derek Penslar, and more recently Antisemitism and Islamophobia, edited by James Renton and Ben Gidley. The question that I would like to address here, however, concerns our contemporary situation: “Is there a variant of the relationship between hatred for Muslims and hatred for Jews today, such that it distinctively characterizes Eastern Europe”?

The 2015–16 migrant crisis, which brought hundreds of thousands of new Muslim migrants to Europe, reinforced the perception that this is so. Hungary, applauded by its erstwhile socialist neighbours, erected a wire fence to keep even more migrants from entering the European Union. “Have East Europeans no shame?” asked the prominent Princeton historian, Jan Gross. Perhaps more than anyone else, Gross has made the world familiar with the anti-Jewish atrocities committed by some Poles during and even after World War II. [1] With that in mind, he continues,

When the war ended, Germany — because of the victors’ denazification policies and its responsibility for instigating and carrying out the Holocaust — had no choice but to “work through” its murderous past. This was a long, difficult process; but German society, mindful of its historical misdeeds, has become capable of confronting moral and political challenges of the type posed by the influx of refugees today. And Chancellor Angela Merkel has set an example of leadership on migrants that puts all of Eastern Europe’s leaders to shame.

Eastern Europe, by contrast, has yet to come to terms with its murderous past. Only when it does will its people be able to recognize their obligation to save those fleeing in the face of evil. [2]

Given Gross’ casual attitude to Eastern Europe, it is not surprising that when he says “Germany” he clearly means West Germany. Now one would certainly think that the many years of intense Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany must have had some effect. This process whereby government, academia, and civil society examined their racist crimes was much more intense in West Germany than in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and East Central Europe. This may well have had an effect on Islamophobia in these areas today. And, incidentally, one must include the former East Germany here, too. The general contours of the claim, and of the facts that underlie...
the claim, that Islamophobia is stronger in Eastern Europe also characterizes the situation within Germany, where it is more pronounced in the East than in the West. Islamophobia, like all social phenomena, is overdetermined everywhere. One reason, albeit one that is very difficult to define, may perhaps be the weight of the past during the Nazi period that has not yet been examined fully.

Nevertheless, too much emphasis on the distant past may obscure the role of the more recent past, which I would argue is stronger. The former foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, claims that there is a direct link between the Nazis and today’s Alternative für Deutschland party, whose success in the 2017 parliamentary elections shocked the country and the world. [3] This is quite an astonishing claim coming from a former government minister who joined the German cabinet nine years after unification. Fischer mentions no responsibility for the frustration that has led to the rise and popularity of the AfD, which remains more popular in the East. Like Gross, Fischer completely evades the question as to whether the behaviour of the West after it won the Cold War might possibly have anything to do with the level and expression of hatred today. This is the effect of positing not just some correlation between current Islamophobia and past antisemitism in Eastern Europe, but an uninterrupted continuity.

Let us pause briefly here to discuss some relevant facts. Are East Europeans more antisemitic and Islamophobic than West Europeans? As a whole, perhaps. However, Fig. 1 shows that this is not necessarily the case for every country. For example, Hungary and Poland are at much the same level as Italy and Greece, according to data provided by the Pew Research Center from 201*. The Czech data are even more damaging to the old-antisemitism-to-new-Islamophobia thesis. For Czechs are more Islamophobic than Poles, it seems, and yet the level of antisemitism observed in the Czech population is low. That the Czech Republic is barely more antisemitic than a typical Western country was also confirmed in a 2015 opinion survey by the Anti-Defamation League, which found that antisemitic opinions were held by 13% of Czechs, compared to 14% of Canadians. [4] The negative correlation here of antisemitism with a high level of Islamophobia is reminiscent less of the “Eastern European” stereotype than of the United States.

Another relevant issue is that of “Islamophobia without Muslims”. It is frequently observed that, while Islamophobia is high in Eastern Europe, “there are no Muslims there”. The absence of Muslims is in fact an example of hyperbole that the thousands of Muslims who live in every East Central European country might not take kindly to. However, the so-called “contact hypothesis” has quite a lot of evidence supporting its claim that people who have more contact with Muslims are less Islamophobic. The situation in much of Eastern Europe may be an exact illustration of this. However, the predictions of the contact hypothesis are also valid for Western Europe and America. It is well-known that Islamophobic sentiment is stronger in rural parts of the West, where there are relatively few Muslims, than in the big cities, where there are many. “Islamophobia without Muslims” turns out to be not an insight into a specifically East European racism, but rather into a context of racism that exists in both the East and the West. Its attribution to the East is an artificial consequence of a methodology that assumes a priori that the units for comparison must be East and West (when in fact that comparison is secondary to the one between province and metropolis).

In the end, the contact hypothesis demonstrates that Islamophobia is caused not by real but by imaginary Muslims. And there is a tradition in Europe (East and West) and its transplants overseas that views Muslims as the enemy, and imagines Islam as an authoritarian religion that denies both a loving God and political liberty. [5] Islamophobic expression has a long tradition.

Nevertheless, the facts are clear. Farid Hafez’s collaborators in the comprehensive Islamophobia Reports describe, for all of Eastern Europe except perhaps the Balkans, the relative dormancy of Islamophobic expression until the 2015–16 migration crisis, when Islamophobia quite suddenly erupted and moved to the centre of political discourse. [6] The most significant watershed was when the ex-communist countries pulled together to oppose the migrant quotas imposed by the European Union. It is not a continuing tradition of antisemitism and Islamophobia that most provoked the political successes of populism, but an unpopular policy from “Brussels” that reinforced the perception that the Eastern members of the Union are talked at but not listened to. Some now even say that “Brussels” has replaced “Moscow” as the new oppressor of their nation. To them, the “Muslim invasion” (a term first used by the French Front National) is simply a creation of “Brussels”.

But let us stay with Gross’ accusation that East European intolerance is due to an undigested past of intoler-
anc. Gross’ approach is based on three assumptions or suggestions, two of which are quite obvious and the other, more subtle. The first is that the antisemitism of the past is connected to the Islamophobia of today. I myself have written several articles supporting this point.

The second suggestion consists of two parts: one, that East European socialism failed to address an antisemitic impulse of the past that specifically characterizes Eastern Europe; and, two, that the post-socialist societies have continued to ignore it as well. It is certainly true that, in spite of some mostly rhetorical opposition to antisemitism, most communist regimes were guilty of antisemitism themselves. It may also be that many or all of the post-socialist governments also failed to address antisemitism and its past crimes adequately. However, the pertinent question is one of causation. Is Islamophobia in Eastern Europe today caused by an active volcanic core of hatred that burns only under the post-communist ground, and so erupts in Islamophobia there but not elsewhere? I do not think so.

The third, more hidden assumption, is that whatever happens in one East European country is an instance that can be generalized to them all. It is to Gross’ great credit that he discovered and publicized the fact that post-Holocaust pogroms have occurred in Poland. They have also occurred in other East European countries, but not in all of them. None are known to have occurred in what is today the Czech Republic, Estonia, or Bulgaria. Yet no one seems to think that there is a problem with describing what happened in Poland as “East European”. This is because observers bring to their analysis a pre-existing notion of Eastern Europe as a unified, single area. If something happens in one place in Eastern Europe, then it is true of all of Eastern Europe. Of course, most observers will say upon reflection that they are fully aware of differences within Eastern Europe. The problem, which I call “Eastern Europeanism”, occurs unreflectedly. An essentialized view of Eastern Europe is the beginning, not the end, of most Western scholarly, journalistic, and popular analysis of the area.

How old is this notion that there are two different Europes, one in the East and the other in the West? According to Peter Wolff, this ontological difference goes back to Enlightenment thought if not before. But much of Wolff’s conclusion is based on his practice of forcing an East Europeanist interpretation on anything that happens in Eastern Europe. Mozart’s remark, “my people of Prague understand me”, for example, is typically interpreted by Wolff as an ironic comment about a linguistically and culturally different Czech audience, when it was actually a straightforward statement of cultural affinity rather than difference, between a German-speaking composer and what was then a mostly German-speaking audience. In reality, the term “Eastern Europe”, with two capital Es, was barely used in English before World War II. In German, the concept may owe much to the best-selling series of novels by Emil Franzos, beginning in 1876 with Aus Halb-Asien (or Out of Half-Asia). [7] These were literary ethnographies of Galicia and Bukovina, the eastern provinces of Austria. Halb-Asien as a concept appeared in opposition to a growing pan-Slavic consciousness, and among other things became a contemptuous Nazi epithet for Russians. The actual term Osteuropa seems to have appeared in scholarship only with the founding of the Osteuropainstitut in Breslau (Wrocław) in 1922, which was occasioned by a desire to study the newly-formed states that replaced Austria-Hungary after World War I.

But it was really only after World War II that terms like Eastern Europe, Osteuropa, and Europe de l’Est gained currency. Wolff suggested that the border between East and West was along the Iron Curtain long before Churchill’s famous 1946 speech on the subject. But this is not so. There was no ontological border to speak of before the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It was during Soviet rule and/or domination that the region became meaningfully distinct from the West. The bleak apartment blocks that are a distinguishing characteristic of the architectural landscape throughout the area were erected along with an almost equally uniform set of institutions and cultural policies. The ideology of building socialism was much the same. Between roughly 1946 and roughly 1989, Eastern Europe did exist as a recognizably distinct part of the continent and of the world.

But not before and, I would argue, not after. After the fall of the Soviet Empire, the experience of Russia of wild capitalism under Yeltsin was only partially matched by the more disciplined transition and relatively solid democratic structures of the Baltic and Central European states. The Balkan states faced different issues again, and so did in different ways different parts of the former Yugoslavia, and Romania and Bulgaria.

I am focusing on the Visegrád Four (or “V4”) countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, because I know the situation there best, but also because my very argument is that there is not enough commonality in Eastern Europe to generalize about all of it.
Soviet domination was the defining feature of the post-World-War II invention of Eastern Europe, but Russia today is a completely different player from the V4. Many government and opposition leaders, it is true, have become warmer to Russia, but in most cases this is because Russia aggressively cultivates its interests within the region. According to a report on Russian disinformation tactics, the Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, compiled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington in 2016, Russia’s aim is to destabilize the Western world through online and offline sources, and it treats East Central Europe not as its own “near abroad”, but simply as a proximate part of the European Union. Russian disinformation has been flexible. For example, in Slovakia, it closely supports the extremist opposition, while in Hungary it helps the populist government. The Russian embassy in Prague has more staff than its embassy in London, which has raised concerns that the Czech capital has become a staging ground for Russian operations within the EU.

All of which goes to say that Russia is a powerful outsider, but by no means a member of the club. It is inconceivable that Russia and the V4 would form an official alliance in the way that was suggested for Austria by the leader of the Freedom Party, Hanz-Christian Strache. Tellingly, the only public objection raised by the now Prime Minister, Sebastian Kurz, was that the V4 would not really want Austria to join.

If Russia cannot be painted with the same “East European” brush as the Visegrád Four, there are major differences even within the alliance. For example, recently the Czechs and Slovaks agreed to new rules for expatriate EU workers championed by French president Macron, while Poland and Hungary opposed them.

The idea of “Eastern Europe” does not persist because of any objective commonalities. It resembles Edward Said’s famous notion of Orientalism. For Said, Orientalism drew on a centuries-long vocabulary to “produce” in the colonial context an Orient ontologically different from the West. There is not an objectively recognizable, pre-existing East-West distinction: the Orient partly overlaps culturally and politically with the West, and variation within the Orient is too great for the Orient to be distinguished on positive grounds. If, nevertheless, an Orient is unquestioningly posited in the West, it is because “Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West” (204). In other words, the West invented the Orient as a concept covering a geographical area where it wished to, and did, assert its superior power. The invention of Orientalism was, according to Said, not a justification after the fact for Western imperialism, but an active ingredient of Western domination itself. It was supported by political, economic, military, and educational institutions, the latter including academic departments, which until Said’s devastating critique were called departments of Oriental Studies.

Similarly, Eastern Europeanism creates and institutionalizes its own object, Eastern Europe. And in its post-Cold-War version, Eastern Europeanism is indeed a “political doctrine willed over” Eastern Europe because Eastern Europe is weaker than the West. Ronald Reagan’s call to “Mr Gorbachev”, which popular history sees as having caused the wall to fall like Joshua’s trumpet, was at first celebrated as a call for East-West unity in Europe. But it soon turned out that, rather than welcoming East Europeans as equals, the West was more interested in helping Western multinationals to swallow up the faltering post-socialist economies. The notion was quite welcome in East Central Europe and the Baltic states, whose citizens considered themselves essentially Western and looked forward to being integrated into the Western

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↑ Figure 1. Percentage of Europeans who have an unfavourable view of Muslims and Jews (Spring 2016). Source: Pew Research Center.8 The Czech statistics are by the Czech Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (2017), and compared ‘Jews’ and ‘Arabs’ (not ‘Muslims’).
economic system, which promised them not only Western goods but also Western wages. Many individuals who had been in commanding positions under communism aided in the sell-out to the West, greatly benefiting themselves from the collaboration. In Russia, however, the same sort of people swooped down on the socialist economic carcass before the West could reach there. It is this Russian economic resistance that, in my view, has created the East Europeanist discourse, which sees the region as an ontologically different part of the continent, where progress as defined by the standards of Western liberal democracy and Western global business not only did not take place, but could not take place. It could not take place there not for contemporary political and economic reasons, as the East Europeanist says, but because of a cultural difference going back centuries. Wolff’s book on the ancient pedigree of the East-West difference was an early manifestation of this new East Europeanism in academia. Popular culture references to Russian gangsters and prostitutes did the job in the everyday imagination. Contrary to early hopes of unity, an imagined wall replaced the real wall.

It is in this context that persistent antisemitism in post-socialist Eastern Europe became an issue in the West. It is part of the discourse of Eastern Europeanism, which in the name of Western liberal values devalues its object, Eastern Europe, and constructs it as an area incapable of rising above its heavy past. Now this must surely ring a bell. For, Islamophobia also constructs a rigid, backward-looking Islamic world, and also contrasts its iliberal aspects as a sign of its unchanging backwardness. Indeed, antisemitism is among the sins attributed to both East Europeans and Muslims. How ironic that an additional sin now attributed to Eastern Europe is that of Islamophobia.

Notes
Reading Islamophobia Through the Lens of James Baldwin

Farid Hafez (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Abstract
This article challenges the claim that the statement 'Islamophobia without Muslims' is unique to the Eastern part of Europe, which is populated by a very small number of Muslims. Rather, it argues that every form of racism essentially relates not to realities but imaginations, not to ontological categories of Muslimness, Jewishness, or Blackness, but imaginations about the racist's perceptions. The existence of racism is to be understood as a projection of the racists, and as something that tells us more about the racists than about the racially excluded. This argument is developed on the basis of the writings of James Baldwin.

Keywords: James Baldwin, Racism, Islamophobia, Whiteness, power
Reading Islamophobia Through the Lens of James Baldwin

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Why does a political scientist choose James Baldwin?
I am a traditionally trained political scientist. Like many graduates from the University of Vienna, I studied political science from my first year in college until receiving my Ph.D. A year after receiving my Ph.D, I founded the Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, an annual academic interdisciplinary journal dedicated to research on Islamophobia.

But why should a political scientist choose a literary critic and novelist to discuss Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism in the East of the European Union? And why a social critic like James Baldwin, who lived at the time of segregation and the uprising of several Black freedom fighters in the 1960s? Some authors may suggest that even theories from Western Europe would be insufficient to discuss Islamophobia in the Eastern part of Europe. So why import theories developed even further away in time and space? Theories from the 1950s to the 1970s developed in the United States of America?

This is the exact point of this article, which is to question the assumption that racism differs across time and space. In this article, I suggest that every kind of racism shares an essential trait across time and space. By suggesting this, I also question one of the phrases that is read and heard most when it comes to Islamophobia in the East of Europe. This title is ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’. More important than being a phrase, it also suggests a relationship between Islam and Muslims, which is a belief shared even beyond the Eastern region of Europe. It is an old myth that surfaces in every debate on racism. With the Jews, it was the idea that there was a ‘Jewish question’. With the Blacks, it was the idea that there was a ‘Negro question’. And with Muslims, it is the idea that there is a ‘Muslim question’. And it is this beautiful way that Baldwin, drawing on the works of so many other Black scholars that preceded him, interrogated this question (one taken for granted by the dominant society) that seems to me so fruitful to discussing Islamophobia, first in the East of Europe, and second in a very general way.

Islamophobia without Muslims?
When it comes to a comparative perspective on Islamophobia in the East and the West of the European Union, many authors tend to stress the idea of ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’ as an essential trait of the East. Largely in contrast to antisemitism and other forms of racism, Islamophobia today is discussed against the backdrop of a perceived ‘real’ Islam and Muslims. In this article, I want to a) fundamentally question the assumption that ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’ is specific to the region of the East of Europe, and b) propose that ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’ reveals a fundamental essence in every form of racism and is therefore also not true for the Western region of Europe. This draws on a basic assumption that racism as a global phenomenon is also based on a shared global history. Neither can we separate Islamophobia from antisemitism, nor antisemitism from what is generally referred to as racism. Antisemitism, Islamophobia are nothing but different faces of a global racial order.

A shared story of racism(s)
Many authors have shown that imagining both the Jewish and Muslim other as the Oriental other, one inside and the other outside of Europe, represents a ‘shared story’. One example of many here is that Jews were charged with poisoning a well in 1321 based on the notion that Muslims had incited them to do so. [1] Also, as Achille Mbembe has argued in his Critique of Black Reason, Islamophobia was nothing but an extension of the global colonial expansion and its colonial heritage of classifying people, placing them into hierarchies, and differentiating between them. And, as James Q. Whitman has recently shown in his study Hitler’s American Model – The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, American race law provided a blueprint for Nazi Germany. He shows that American citizenship
and anti-miscegenation laws proved directly relevant to the two principal Nuremberg Laws—the Citizenship Law and the Blood Law. [2] Based on this interconnectedness of different forms of racism in place and time, there is much reason to transfer insights from one form of racism to our understanding of seemingly new and current forms of racism such as Islamophobia.

**James Baldwin on racism**

This will be done by drawing on the writer and social critic James Baldwin, especially with regard to his unfinished manuscript *Remember This House*, which became famous when it was expanded and adapted for cinema as the Academy Award-nominated documentary film *I Am Not Your Negro*. By connecting Baldwin’s thinking to the question of Islamophobia in Eastern Europe, I want to gain an insight into Islamophobia by doing what I think was essential for the literary figure Baldwin: turning the tables and asking different questions.

James Baldwin’s reflections in a debate with Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, together with moderator Kenneth Clark on 24 May 1963, reveal a central insight of racism theory. He argued:

But the Negro in this country … the future of the Negro in this country is precisely as bright or dark as the future of the country … What white people have to do is try and find out in their own hearts why it was necessary to have a ‘nigger’ in the first place, because I am not a nigger, I’m a man. But if you think I’m a nigger, it means you need him … I’m not the nigger here and you invented him, you the white people invented him, then you’ve got to find out why. And the future of the country depends on that, whether or not it is able to ask that question.

Baldwin is asking, like other scholars of antisemitism, racism and Orientalism, what was really behind the invention, marking and subsequent exclusion of the ‘other’. Because, as Sartre argued in his *Anti-Semite and Jew*, “if the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him” [3]. Or, as Edward Said put it in *Orientalism*, the imagination of the Orient was based on “desires, regressions, investments, and projections”. [4] Following Baldwin, we have to find out why this figure of the ‘other’ was invented. For Baldwin, similarly to Said, who saw Orientalism as a powerful political instrument of domination, it is about power:

I attest to this:
the world is not white;
it never was white,
cannot be white.
White is a metaphor for power [...]. [5]

Hence, the problem is not a ‘Jewish problem’ or a ‘Muslim problem’; rather it is a problem of the dominant society itself. Similarly, Said argues that Orientalism was “a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern over the Orient”. So what ideas do Islamophobes project onto Islam?

Or, according to Baldwin himself, the dominant society has to find out why it had to invent the Muslim ‘figure’. And also: can we identify a will to govern in terms of contemporary Islamophobia?

It would be wrong to generalize with regard to Islamophobes. Islamophobia has become a hegemonic discourse that is shared by numerous actors from a diverse range of social milieus: right-wing extremists, but also Christian democrats and social democrats, as well as more leftist political actors, Christian fundamentalists, white feminists, ideologically driven racists, Muslim governments and self-orientalizing Muslims. It has recently become a more relevant force in international politics, domestic political culture, and the arts, and it is therefore manifested in different ways.

For reasons of clarity, I will only take some examples here to discuss Baldwin’s question as to ‘why’ this Muslim figure was invented, and what the white metaphor of power means in this invention. To indicate the variety of actors of Islamophobia, I discuss two studies that deal with quite different actors and material that they have produced. I do so in order to illustrate the diversity within the hegemonic discourse of Islamophobia.

**Islamophobia in US Foreign Policy**

In contrast to the case of anti-Black racism, Islamophobia today first and foremost plays a central role in international relations. Islamophobia in its current formation has recently been shaped especially in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of an age of ‘a clash of civilizations’, as theorized by Samuel P. Huntington. The single superpower on this planet, the USA, has relied heavily on Islamophobia as a discourse to widen its
power. The demonization of Saddam Hussein with the false allegations that he possessed nuclear weapons to invade Iraq, the declaration of the ‘war on terror’ to mobilize many Western countries in its fight against the Muslim enemy, the invasion of Afghanistan to free women from oppressive Muslim men: all of this happened with the help of an Islamophobic discourse that allowed the US to intervene, kill, and destroy while representing itself as free, enlightened, and freedom-seeking. Stephen Sheehi has shown in his *Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign Against Muslims* that Islamophobia was deployed primarily to keep the US empire relevant. His main argument is that “Islamophobia is an ideological construct deployed to facilitate US presence and, in fact, make US domination seem necessary” [6] in those countries that were torn by war after US invasion. He argues further that

the parallax of American power is such that it must convert its vision into reality if it is to remain relevant in the Arab world, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, remaining relevant, not oil or the spread of democracy, is the United States’ primary *raison d’être* for its presence in the Middle East. [...] a more effective strategy in maintaining relevance in Iraq and the region is to maintain a state of tension and conflict intense enough to make local allies need Washington’s military, political and economic assistance, but also sufficiently low-grade that it does not call for the presence of American boots on the ground. The United States profits from instability just as it benefits from fear. Instability activates the militaristic, patriotic, if not jingoistic tendencies in the population that easily justify what otherwise seems like boldfaced aggression or occupation. [7]

Stephen Sheehi shows the central role of Islamophobia by referring to the works of important scholars who advise the US political elite and regularly inform the US public in regard to US politics in the Middle East such as Bernard Lewis and Fareed Zakaria. According to Sheehi, an additional reason why Islamophobia has become engrained in American culture and its political unconscious is that Islamophobia operates in a society with its own troubled history of racism: “The United States has a sustained history not only of the dehumanization, disenfranchisement and occupation of Blacks, Native Americans, and Asians but also of transforming this racist hate into political action, with hunts and pogroms to control dissent and discontent. Islamophobia has now been interwoven within this same history”. [8] To conclude, we can argue that Islamophobia is a means of gaining, stabilizing, and widening power for the US empire.

**Anders Behring Breivik**

A different case would be a single and powerless actor who is embedded in a digital network of racist conspiracy theorists: Anders Behring Breivik, who murdered 77 people on 22 July 2011 during a socialist youth camp, targeting future leaders who for him represented a multicultural elite that would enable an Islamicization of Europe. As Sindre Bangstad has shown in his study *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia*, Breivik regarded himself as a ‘conservative Christian’ and was linked to the right-wing populist Progressive Party (PP) from 1997 to 2006. [9] In his 2008: A *European Declaration of Independence*, Breivik argued that the enablers of the Islamicization of Europe, cultural Marxists together with Muslims, had to be stopped, while in court he defended his killing of 77 mostly teenagers as necessary. Breivik presented himself as a pro-Zionist who was antisemitic, as a conservative Christian who wanted to rescue the Christian West and defend it against Islamicization, as a Freemason whose order had excluded him on the day that his attacks were revealed to the public. He was convinced that his act of mass killing was “cruel, but necessary” to stop the Islamic ‘conquest’ and ‘colonization’ of Europe. [10] According to Breivik, the European elite, represented by ‘cultural Marxists’ and the ‘multicultural/ist alliance’, have “entered into a ‘devil’s pact’ with the enemy leading to the impending establishment of a Eurabia”. [11] For Breivik, Islamicization had already taken place and was ongoing. Hence, we can say that Breivik projects nothing less than his own wish for Europe to be not multicultural, but mono-cultural? A Europe that is Christian and only Christian, and that has no space for people of other faiths? A Europe for what he calls ‘native Europeans’, which suggests that he longs for a ‘racially pure’ Europe? Is it exactly this longing that explains Breivik’s Islamophobia? For Breivik, Europeans have to abolish the European Union, which for him is “currently the principal (though not the only) motor behind the Islamicization of Europe, perhaps the greatest betrayal in this civilization’s history”. [12] Quoting his main inspiration, an author called Fjordman, he argues:
We also need to reject the ‘You turn into what you fight’ argument. The British, the Americans and the Canadians didn’t become Nazis while fighting Nazi Germany, did they? The truth is, we will become like Muslims if we don’t fight them and keep them out of our countries, since they will subdue us and Islamise us by force. The West isn’t feared because we are ‘oppressors’; we are despised because we are perceived as being decadent and weak.[13]

Hence, as many have argued, Breivik himself projects a certain kind of masculinity in what is generally portrayed as the hyper-masculine, strong, armed Islamist warrior. In the case of Breivik, it might also be the lack of recognition that he received as a person that might explain his commitment to leading a struggle against Islamicization. Hence, he sees himself in a long war, which others such as Pope Urban II, Charles Martel and others have waged before him.[14] Hence, is it this lack of recognition, this irrelevance of his person in the history of humankind, that he aims to compensate for by his act of killing and presenting a message of war between Islam and Christianity? Again quoting Fjordman, Breivik sees that Europe today has three enemies in its fight against the Islamicization of its lands: “Enemy 1 is the anti-Western bias of our media and academia, which is a common theme throughout the Western world. Enemy 2 are Eurabians and EU-federalists, who deliberately break down established nation states in favour of a pan-European super state. Enemy 3 are Muslims”. [15] Is it the amount of self-criticism of the Western intellectual public, especially some of its leftist imprint, that disturbs Breivik? Is it the supranational European Union that represents what many nativist right-wing parties see as a threat to their imagined Europe of sovereign nations that disturbs him? Is it Muslims, whom Breivik imagines as the masculine, violent embodiment of heroism on one side and the threat to Europe on the other side?

Baldwin again
We can echo the words of James Baldwin when he speaks as a black man to white America about the question of the black figure: “It is not a racial problem. [...] It is a problem of whether or not you’re willing to look at your life and be responsible for it, and then begin to change it. [...] And it is because the American people are unable to face the fact that I am flesh of their flesh, bone of their bone, created by them. My blood, my father’s blood, is in that soil”. [16]
Nationalism and Perceptions of Threat – Ethnocentrism or Just a Lack of Contact? Islamophobia in Eastern Europe from a Comparative Perspective

by Gert Pickel [1] (Leipzig University, Germany) and Cemal Öztürk [2] (Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany)

Abstract
Research on Islamophobia has so far focused predominantly on Western European societies. In view of the hostile reactions towards Muslim refugees shown by Eastern European governments, there is still a sizeable research gap with regard to Islamophobia in Eastern Europe. The aim of our article is to survey the extent of anti-Muslim prejudice beyond Western Europe and to shed light on its social-psychological determinant patterns. Our results show that the rise of Islamophobia is a pan-European phenomenon, and it rests upon similar social-psychological underpinnings. Perceptions of threat and ethnocentrism turn out to be its core drivers. Beyond these similarities, Islamophobia is more widespread in Eastern Europe. This empirical pattern is in line with the theoretical assumptions of the contact hypothesis. The absence of Muslim communities in Eastern Europe leads to fewer contacts or friendships with immigrants, and more sceptical perceptions of intergroup contacts. These factors strengthen a social climate in which anti-Muslim prejudice prevails.
Nationalism and Perceptions of Threat – Ethnocentrism or Just a Lack of Contact? Islamophobia in Eastern Europe from a Comparative Perspective

by Gert Pickel [1] (Leipzig University, Germany) and Cemal Öztürk [2] (Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany)

Introduction – Islamophobia, the New Orientalism?
A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Islamophobia. What is the newsworthiness of this statement, one might ask. Unease, reservation, fear and even hatred of Islam and Muslims have long traditions in Europe. Since Edward Said’s seminal study on Orientalism, it is widely acknowledged that the West has associated Islam with negative images for hundreds of years. [3] The perception of Islam as an aggressive menace to Western societies has gained in importance in the aftermath of the Cold War and in particular since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. [4] Surveys show that derogatory attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are widespread among Western publics. [5] Given the climate of fear created by a number of terrorist attacks committed by the so-called Islamic State (e.g. in Paris, Marseille, Barcelona, Berlin), it seems unlikely that the career of Islam as the scapegoat of Europe has yet reached its climax.

The new issue is that Eastern European governments joined the anti-Islam chorus during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. One indication of this trend is the joint action of the Visegrád states against binding quotas for the allocation of refugees to individual EU member states. [6] In this vein, the rejection of Islam and Muslims is expressed loudly. Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico openly states that “Islam has no place in his country”. [7] Czech President Miloš Zeman calls Islam “a religion of death” and argues that to speak of “moderate Muslims” is as contradictory as referring to “moderate Nazis”. [8] For Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the strong man of the Polish Law and Justice Party, the influx of migrants poses a threat to Europe’s “Christian identity” as the ultimate goal of Muslims is the “establishment of Sharia law”. [9] Last but not least, Victor Orbán portrays Hungary as the last “bastion against the Islamicization of Europe”. [10] In his view, Muslims are a “danger to Europeans’ employment and living conditions”. [11]

Research on Islamophobia has so far focused predominantly on Western European societies. [12] With regard to the hostile reactions towards Muslim refugees of Eastern European governments, one might argue that there is still a sizeable research gap when it comes to Islamophobia in Eastern Europe. [13] The aim of our article is to examine the extent and causes of derogatory attitudes towards Muslims beyond Western Europe. First, we ask whether Islamophobia is really on the rise in Europe and whether it is (perhaps) more widespread in Eastern than in Western Europe? Second, we are interested in the potential causes of anti-Muslim attitudes. Given the fact that Muslim communities are virtually absent in most Eastern European societies, we wonder whether the determinant patterns of anti-Muslim prejudice vary between Eastern and Western Europe.

To shed light on these questions, we consult theories of social psychology. The statements of Eastern European politicians reveal that Muslims are perceived as a threat in contemporary Europe. Judging individuals negatively because of their group membership is the essence
of prejudice, and social psychology offers a long tradition for the scientific study of the cognitive and social processes that promote these attitudes towards outgroups. [14] Not surprisingly, established theories of social psychology such as the Social Identity Theory [15], Integrated Threat Theory [16], and the Contact Hypothesis [17] have found their way into studies that deal with the causes of Islamophobia. [18]

To gauge the extent of Islamophobia and to investigate its causes from a comparative perspective, we rely on representative public opinion surveys. Public opinion surveys serve our scientific objective for two reasons. First, they collect their data by means of a random selection scheme. An aggregation of individual-level data (e.g. the number of people that support a ban on Muslim immigration) allows us to describe the prevalence of anti-Muslim attitudes in European societies. Second, many public opinion surveys contain acknowledged indicators which enable us to measure empirically the constructs that are integral parts of theoretical explanations for the formation of prejudiced attitudes. Applying quantitative methods allows us to test the explanatory power of these theories and to provide information on the social-psychological causes that drive individual anti-Muslim prejudice. Another advantage of public opinion surveys – such as the European Values Survey [19] and the European Social Survey [20] – is that they have been carried out in Eastern as well as Western European societies. A structured comparison of the causal drivers of Islamophobia in Eastern and Western Europe allows us to scrutinize whether anti-Muslim prejudice draws upon general sources, or whether there are peculiarities within different national contexts.

Islamophobia – Dazzling Term or an Emerging Comparative Concept?
What exactly do we mean by Islamophobia? First of all, we should state that Islamophobia is a highly contested term. [21] While the term is widely used by organizations in civil society [22], and by political actors [23], its emergence as a comparative concept in the social sciences is rather new. [24] A great deal of attention in the research field is dedicated to the subtle distinctions (and sometimes flawed boundaries) between Islamophobia, criticism of Islam and its adherents, and outright hostility towards them. [25] As highly diverse phenomena are discussed under the dazzling label of Islamophobia, some authors even advocate avoiding the term in the academic realm. [26] However, Bleich (2011) argues that social scientists would be ill-advised to do so, as the term is intended to label a social reality; that is to say, “Islam and Muslims have emerged as objects of aversion, fear, and hostility in contemporary liberal democracies”. [27] In this vein, Bleich (2011) proposes a widely used definition of Islamophobia, which is “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims”. [28]

We adopt this definition, as it is widespread in the academic community, but we limit its scope to indiscriminate negative attitudes towards Muslims. There are good empirical and normative reasons to do so. Using factor analysis, Uenal (2016) presents evidence that attitudes towards Islam and Muslims comprise two different dimensions. [29] From a normative perspective, a too broad understanding of Islamophobia (which encompasses a criticism of Islam) is problematic as it places the legitimate criticism of religion (e.g. for its subordination of women) under the suspicion of prejudice. [30]

This narrower understanding of Islamophobia is largely in line with Allport’s (1971) characterization of prejudice, which he describes as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization”. [31] In short: We use the term Islamophobia to describe negative attitudes towards Muslims based on their perceived religious background. As non-practising Muslims face discrimination because of their ethnocultural characteristics, it is an alleged group identity that drives anti-Muslim prejudice. [32] Thus, there are good reasons to explore its causes in the light of social-psychological theories of prejudice and stereotyping.

Social-psychological drivers of Islamophobia
At a basic level, anti-Muslim prejudice arises from a process of categorization. Individuals attribute negative characteristics to a large human group based on their perceived religious background. We argue that Social Identity Theory is a good starting-point to identify the factors that determine the emergence of Islamophobia, as the process of categorization is closely interlinked with the construction of collective identities. [33] Social Identity Theory assumes that prejudice arises from an “actor’s identification of themselves and the others belonging to different social categories”. [34] This categorization process rests upon a comparison in which “the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups”. [35] This comparison serves psy-
A precondition for Islamophobia to emerge from this categorization process is that individuals “have internalized their group membership as an aspect of their self-concept: they must be subjectively identified with the relevant in-group” [37]. It is at this point that nationalism comes into play. Nationalism is a powerful anchor for an individual’s social identity and derives from “his/her knowledge of his/her membership of a social […] group together with the value and emotional significance attached to it”. [38] We define nationalism as an individual’s ‘subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation’. [39] As a nation is a socially constructed community imagined by people, nationalism manifests itself in affective attitudes towards collective symbols, a common language, history, and traditions. [40] Nationalism is likely to accompany Islamophobic attitudes as it establishes dividing lines between “us and the others”, and therefore sustains exclusive group identities. [41]

Hypothesis 1: Individuals that strongly identify with their nation are more likely to feel prejudice towards Muslims.

Another powerful source of in-group identification seems to be religion. Eastern European politicians refer to the “Christian heritage” of their nations to justify their country’s refusal to host Muslim refugees. [42] Consequently, it is worth analyzing whether and how religiosity relates to Islamophobia. Religiosity is a multifaceted personal experience and encompasses religious beliefs (e.g. belief in God), religious behaviour (e.g. attending religious ceremonies), and a sense of religious belonging (e.g. allegiance towards a certain religious denomination). [43] Across the board, the potential effects of religiosity on prejudice are considered as highly ambivalent. [44] On the one hand, one might argue that religion breeds values such as solidarity and altruism. [45] On the other, though, religiosity is found to be correlated with prejudice and xenophobia. [46] We argue that religiosity accompanies anti-Muslim prejudice for two reasons. First, religion is a source for identifying with an in-group beyond nationalism. [47] Second, the very existence of Muslims and their sheer “religious otherness” can induce a feeling of threat among the in-group and therefore aggravate the us-versus-them divide. [48]

Hypothesis 2: Religious individuals are more likely to feel prejudice towards Muslims.

Of course, there is no automatic link between identification with an in-group and prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups. The categorization process is more likely to emerge if the respective out-group is perceived as an object of fear. [49] This is certainly the case with Islamophobia: the scapegoating of Muslims has a long tradition in European history. [50] On top of that, there are good reasons to assume that terrorist attacks help to consolidate such feelings. [51] The impact of fear on prejudiced attitudes occupies a central position in the Integrated Threat Theory, which assumes that an in-group’s realistic and symbolic perception of threat is the core driver of prejudice. [52] If the in-group considers the very existence of an out-group to be a risk to its physical and material well-being, then this indicates a realistic threat. [53]

When Victor Orbán states that “Muslim refugees may turn out to be terrorists”, [55] then this is a clear attempt to strengthen realistic perceptions of threat among his compatriots. We assume that prejudice is a likely outcome if individuals fall in line with these kinds of anti-Muslim stereotypes.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals that perceive out-groups as a threat to their physical and material well-being are more likely to feel prejudice towards Muslims.

Much of the anti-Muslim rhetoric that we have described aims to encourage symbolic perceptions of threat among Eastern European citizens. The essence of symbolic fears is the perception of sharp “group differences in morals, values, standards, beliefs and attitudes”. [56] Miloš Zeman’s characterization of Islam as a “religion of death” implies a dichotomy between the violent and brutish culture of Muslims and the peaceful and civilized qualities of the Czech population. [57] Key phrases like the alleged “Islamicization of Europe” tap into the same seam. [58] If Eastern European citizens are susceptible to this kind of rhetoric, then attitudes of rejection towards Muslim immigrants are a likely outcome.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals that perceive migrants as a threat to their cultural values are more likely to feel prejudice towards Muslims.

In the long run, we assume that the combination of identifying with the in-group (via nationalism and religiosity) and (realistic and symbolic) perceptions of threat vis-à-vis
out-groups accompanies more rigid forms of “in-group favouritism and discrimination against the out-group”. [59] This state of mind comes close to Levinson’s (1949) notion of ethnocentrism. [60] The perception of a sharp divide between us and the others is exaggerated to the extent that “out-groups are the objects of negative opinions and hostile attitudes; in-groups are the objects of positive opinions and uncritically supportive attitudes; and out-groups are regarded as properly subordinate to in-groups”. [61] We consider ethnocentrism to be a more valid explanation of Islamophobia than nationalism. National identification in terms of constitutional patriotism [62] may fulfil positive functions for a democratic political community. Ethnocentrism, however, is likely to play a harmful role as it “involves blind attachment to certain national cultural variables, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as out-groups”. [63]

Hypothesis 5: Individuals with an ethnocentric worldview are more likely to feel prejudice towards Muslims

Even though we consider collective identities, the perception of threat, and ethnocentrism as important causes of Islamophobia, we wonder whether the virtual absence of Muslim communities in Eastern Europe is a relevant explanation in its own right. At least, advocates of the Contact Hypothesis would raise this question. The contact hypothesis assumes that an individual’s contact with members of an out-group is conducive to tearing down existing prejudice. [64] Once again, there is no automatic mechanism link this to less prejudiced attitudes. Allport (1971) argued that the assumed mechanism depends upon the type (e.g. teammates, friendship and kinship) and quality of the contact situations. [65] Bearing in mind this criticism, we nevertheless assume that individuals who stay in contact with out-groups, make friends with people from other ethnicities, and perceive these contacts as positive are less likely to feel prejudice towards Muslims. However, we argue that it is important to distinguish between the individual and the societal level. At the individual level, we expect similar effects among citizens in Eastern and Western Europe. Given the small number of Muslim communities, this effect at the individual level is lacking in Eastern European societies, however. Most citizens in Eastern Europe seldom meet Muslims. [66] Consequently, Eastern European citizens tend to have parasocial contacts with Muslims. In the absence of opportunities for direct contact, it seems likely that media consumption (e.g. television and the Internet) creates the illusion of direct contacts. Parasocial contacts give rise to anti-Muslim prejudice for two reasons. First, the mass media has in general a negative news bias. Second, news coverage of terrorist attacks committed by Islamists shapes the prevailing image of all Muslims. [67] In doing so, the media facilitates prejudice against Muslim immigrants and gives rise to a phenomenon that could be described as Islamophobia without Muslims.

Hypothesis 6: Low level of opportunity for contact with other ethnicities makes anti-Muslim prejudice more likely at the societal level

Research Design

Our empirical study pursues a threefold objective: we shed light on the prevalence of Islamophobia in European societies, its development in the last three decades, and its potential social-psychological determinants. In doing so, we rely on public opinion polls such as the European Values Survey and the European Social Survey. The timing of these surveys fits our research goals perfectly. The European Values Survey encompasses points in time before (1999) and after (2008) the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In addition, the European Social Survey was conducted immediately prior to the so-called refugee crisis (2014). The data allow us to show that there is a certain continuity of Islamophobic sentiments and of the social-psychological personality traits that enable such sentiments – which also indicates that Islamophobia is not a by-product of the polarized debates that accompanied the so-called refugee crisis.

We collected data for the 28 member states of the European Union to provide general information about the anti-Muslim climate in European societies. Regarding the social-psychological drivers of Islamophobia (which implies an analysis at the individual level), we decided to compare Eastern and Western European societies (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands). This case selection resembles the idea of a Most-Different-System-Design, as we compare cases with highly distinctive characteristics at the system level (e.g. countries with significant and marginal Muslim communities), while assuming similar causal patterns (Hypotheses 1–5) that drive anti-Muslim attitudes. [68] But, as already mentioned, we consider the diverging sizes of Muslim communities – which accom-
pany the low level of opportunity for contact in Eastern Europe – as an important explanation of Islamophobia in its own right (Hypothesis 6). To scrutinize this assumption, we will present societal-level evidence for the member states of the European Union that have been surveyed by the European Social Survey (2014).

In Table 1, we list the operationalization of our theoretical constructs. To provide a descriptive overview of the magnitude of Islamophobia in Europe since the end of the 1990s, we present approval ratings of items that were designed to measure anxiety with regard to Muslims (see Table 2). To test our theoretical assumptions about the social-psychological underpinnings of Islamophobia, we run several logistic regression models (see Table 3). It is the binary nature of our dependent variable that makes logistic regression the appropriate technique for us. At its core, logistic regression helps us to understand which of the two groups of the binary dependent variable people ultimately fall into: Do they accept or do they reject Muslim neighbours? The basic idea of a (logistic) regression analysis is to link a dependent variable to different independent variables. If we apply this logic to our research interest, it means that we consider nationalism, religiosity, perceptions of threat, and ethnocentrism as independent variables that have an impact on our dependent variable, which is Islamophobic attitudes. We follow the usual practice of sociological analysis and control for a respondent’s educational level, gender and age. Regression analysis offers a mathematical procedure to analyze the relative impact of the independent variables and to assess the overall explanatory power of our theoretical model. In less technical terms, regression analysis allows us to investigate which social-psychological factors really matter for Islamophobia, and which we can ignore. The effect of a factor sometimes vanishes if we control another factor. Is it, for example, really nationalism or ethnocentric worldviews that drive anxiety with regard to Muslims? Furthermore, a regression analysis helps us to describe the direction of an empirical relationship. In our example, it is odds ratios that provide information about the probability that respondents will reject Muslims as their neighbours compared to the probability that they will accept them.
### European Values Survey (1999 & 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Construct</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>Don’t like as neighbours: Muslims</td>
<td>1 = mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = not mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>How proud are you to be a [country] citizen</td>
<td>1 = very proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = not proud at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>Do you belong to a religious denomination/How often attend religious services/ How important is god in your</td>
<td>Additive index:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = very religious person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = not religious at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic Threat Perception</td>
<td>Immigrants take away job from [nationality]/Immigrants increase crime problems/ Immigrants are a strain on welfare system</td>
<td>Additive index:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = high threat perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = no threat perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Threat Perception</td>
<td>Immigrants undermine country’s cultural life</td>
<td>Additive index:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = high threat perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = no threat perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>Important to have [country nationality] ancestry/Jobs are scarce: Giving [nation] priority/Don’t like as neighbours: People of different race</td>
<td>Additive index:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = strongly ethnocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = not ethnocentric at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Highest education level attained</td>
<td>1 = University with degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Elementary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Sex of respondent</td>
<td>1 = Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age of respondent</td>
<td>1 = Oldest respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Youngest respondent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Construct</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Aggregation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>Allow many or few Muslims to come and live in country</td>
<td>Share of citizens that want allow no Muslims to come and live in their country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity of contact</td>
<td>Different race or ethnic group: contact, how often</td>
<td>Share of citizens that meet migrants at least once a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of contact (I)</td>
<td>Different race or ethnic group: contact, how often: have any close friends</td>
<td>Share of citizens that have several or a few friends among migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of contact (II)</td>
<td>Different race or ethnic group: contact, how bad or good</td>
<td>Share of citizens that perceives contact as good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Operationalization of theoretical constructs
Source: European Values Survey & European Social Survey. Own figure.
Odds ratios can range between 0 and infinity. An odds ratio of less than 1 indicates a negative relationship, while an odds ratio of more than 1 describes a positive relationship. In Germany, for example, each unit increase on the nationalism scale increases the odds of rejecting a Muslim neighbour by a factor of 2.35 (see Table 3). [69] Finally, we will present scatterplots to shed light on the explanatory power of the contact hypothesis. A scatterplot is a data visualization tool that allows us to map the relationship between the intensity of contacts with migrants and the prevalence of anti-Muslim attitudes in European societies. [70]

Is Islamophobia on the rise and is it more widespread in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe?
Looking at Table 2, which displays the evolution of people’s susceptibility to anti-Muslim resentments in Europe since the late 1990s, we can conclude that Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe. However, there is no sign that there was a dramatic boost in anti-Muslim prejudice between 1999 (19.9%) and 2008 (21.3%). These figures indicate that anxiety towards Muslims was already at a high level before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The magnitude of Islamophobia reached its (temporary) peak just before the so-called refugee crisis: among the European nations that surveyed by the ESS (2014), support for an immigration ban on Muslims is close to 25%.

This general overview of the prevalence of Islamophobia among member states of the European Union veils significant differences between Europe’s different regions. Islamophobia is most widespread in Eastern Europe. We can observe this phenomenon at every point in time that we studied. The high prevalence of Islamophobic attitudes was already observable in the late 1990s (23.1%), and even its upward trend between 1999 and 2008 (+3.4%) was most clear-cut among Europe’s post-socialist nations. At this point, the rise of attitudes of rejection regarding Muslim neighbours in countries such as Austria (+14.9%) and Germany (+12.9%) should certainly not be played down, but in general the magnitude of reservations towards Muslims was much smaller among Western European (14.8–17.7%), Scandinavian (14.7–16.4%), and Mediterranean (16.9–21.3%) countries.

This empirical pattern continues right up until the so-called refugee crisis: support for an immigration ban for Muslims is most widespread among Eastern European societies (39.9%), and clearly exceeds the average approval of restrictive immigration policies in Western Europe (16.3%), Scandinavia (10.5%), and Mediterranean countries (25.4%). Miloš Zeman and Victor Orbán’s hostility towards Muslim refugees should not surprise us at all, if we consider the fact that more than half of the respondents in the Czech Republic (56.1%) and Hungary (50.9%) are in favour of a Muslim ban. It can be concluded that Islamophobia is hardly a new trend in Eastern Europe, but it appears likely that it was intensified by the influx of Muslim refugees. The rise of anti-Muslim attitudes in Hungary between 2008 (11%) and 2014 (50.9%) is an alarming indication of this trend.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Share of citizens that don't like Muslims as their neighbours in % (EVS 1999)</th>
<th>Share of citizens that don't like Muslims as their neighbours in % (EVS 2008)</th>
<th>Difference between 2008 and 1999 in %</th>
<th>Share of citizens that want to allow no Muslims to come and live in their country in % (ESS 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>+13.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>+10.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>+13.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>+16.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>+2.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>+14.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>+12.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>+4.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>+6.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>+6.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>+4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>+6.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>+1.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

↑ Table 2: Islamophobic attitudes among member states of the European Union
Source: European Values Survey & European Social Survey. Own figure.
Social-psychological drivers of Islamophobia: collective identities, perceptions of threat, ethnocentrism, or just a lack of contact?

What causes anti-Muslim prejudice? Does Islamophobia rest upon similar social-psychological patterns in Eastern and Western Europe? In view of our regression results (see Table 3), we need to admit that the explanatory power of nationalism and religiosity is of minor importance. Both factors show varying effects in different national contexts. In contrast to our first hypothesis, we observe that Hungarians with a strong sense of national pride are less likely to reject Muslims as their neighbours (odds ratios = .29, p = .001). A possible reason for this surprising finding could be the fact that there was a rather pro-Islam discourse in the mid-2000s. At that time, even the Jobbik Party had an outsider role among Europe’s far-right parties since its antisemitic party leaders declared sympathy for Islam and maintained friendly relations with the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. [71] The situation is different in Germany, where it is citizens with nationalistic sentiments that are more likely to reject Muslims as their neighbours (odds ratios = 2.35, p = .001). This finding might reflect one legacy of Germany’s rather exclusionary notion of nationalism. Until its reform in 2000, German citizenship law was based exclusively on the principle of jus sanguinis. [72]

Beyond nationalism, our results confirm Allport and Ross’ (1967) wisdom that religion has ambivalent repercussions for prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups. [73] While devout people in Slovakia tend to reject Muslim neighbours (odds ratios = 1.93, p = .008), religiosity has the opposite effect in Great Britain (odds ratios = .29, p = .001) and Germany (odds ratios = .39, p = .001). In these cases, religious individuals take the Biblical commandment of love-thy-neighbour in the literal sense, and express less hostility towards Muslims than their non-religious fellow citizens. We assume that the empirical pattern in Germany corresponds to differences between Eastern and Western Germany. Eastern Germany is not only a stronghold of people without religious affiliations; its citizens are also more likely to express anti-Muslim prejudice. [74]

Beside these peculiarities of national contexts, our results show that Islamophobia rests upon quite similar social-psychological underpinnings in European societies. Essentially, it is a mixture of perceptions of threat and ethnocentrism that drives anxiety with regard to Muslims. As we have already explained, there is a distinction between realistic and symbolic perceptions of threat in Integrated Threat Theory. [75] With regard to Islamophobia, realistic perceptions of threat seem to be the decisive driver. Thus, we can observe a uniform effect: from the West to the East, European citizens that regard immigrants as a threat to their physical and material well-being tend to reject Muslims in their immediate neighbourhood (odds ratios range from 1.83 in Slovakia to 10.13 in Great Britain). Symbolic perceptions of threat, by which is meant perceiving immigrants as a threat to one’s own culture, turns out to be an intensifier of Islamophobia in Hungary (odds ratios = 1.74, p = .05), Slovakia (odds ratios = 2.32, p = .004), and Germany (odds ratios = 2.23, p = .004). Overall, symbolic perceptions of threat are of minor importance compared to realistic perceptions. Put bluntly: Islamophobia is caused more by fears connected to economic and security issues than it is by the diffuse fear of an Islamicization of Europe.

As described above, we cannot observe strong and uniform effects of nationalism and religiosity. However, it would be premature to conclude that in-group favouritism and pejorative attitudes towards out-groups (which are the essence of ethnocentrism) do not matter at all for Islamophobia. Our empirical results reveal unambiguously that ethnocentric worldviews drive hostility towards Muslims in the neighbourhood (odds ratios range from 10.94 in Slovakia to 122.90 in Great Britain).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Don’t like as neighbours: Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1.36 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.29*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.82 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.55* (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.38 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.35*** (0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.62 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.75 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.65 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.25 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.93*** (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.65 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.38*** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.29*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.99 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic Threat</td>
<td>3.03*** (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.01*** (2.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.48** (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.83 (0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.23 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.21*** (3.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.13*** (3.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Threat</td>
<td>0.76 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.74* (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.46 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.23*** (0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.92 (0.98)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.23*** (0.62)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.53 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.11 (0.43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>36.43*** (12.17)</td>
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<td>45.70*** (25.17)</td>
</tr>
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<td>32.88*** (12.81)</td>
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<td>10.94*** (4.44)</td>
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<td>66.67*** (35.48)</td>
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<td>11.10*** (3.76)</td>
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<td>122.90*** (74.02)</td>
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<td>1.23 (0.52)</td>
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<td>0.78 (0.24)</td>
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<td>0.74 (0.27)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.61 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.86 (0.11)</td>
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<td>0.99 (0.18)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.94 (0.13)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.76* (0.12)</td>
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<td>0.92 (0.21)</td>
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<td>0.84 (0.16)</td>
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<td>0.80 (0.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.63 (0.18)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.11 (0.48)</td>
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<td>0.87 (0.27)</td>
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<td>1.12 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2.39 (1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.95 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.65*** (2.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.72 (0.64)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.11 (0.33)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.11 (0.33)</td>
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<td>1.11 (0.33)</td>
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<td>1.11 (0.33)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.11 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.11 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Social-psychological causes of Islamophobia

Source: EVS 2008. Note: Entries are Odds Ratios. Standard Errors in parentheses. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Own figure.
Figure 1: The effect of the factual size of Muslim communities and contacts on the average support for a Muslim ban.

Sources: Pew 2011 & European Social Survey 2014. Own figure.
Lastly, it should be noted that our control variables show only small effects. Compared to Slovakian men, Slovakian women are slightly more likely to accept Muslims in their neighbourhood (odds ratio = .76, p = .080). In Great Britain, it is the elderly that are more likely to feel discomfort with regard to Muslims (odds ratio = 4.65, p = .002). As the education level of respondents turns out to be a non-significant parameter, one might conclude that Islamophobia is a phenomenon that shapes the entire range of the social stratum.

At this point, it is reasonable to raise a caveat: the explanatory power of our theoretical model is much higher in Western Europe (Pseudo-R-Squared range from .16 in Germany to .21 in France) than in Eastern Europe (Pseudo-R-Squared range from .07 in Slovakia to .12 in the Czech Republic). Against the backdrop of these results, the question arises whether factors at the societal level – such as the smaller sizes of Muslim communities in Eastern Europe – exert unique effects. [76] As the scatterplot in the upper left-hand corner (see Figure 1) illustrates, there is indeed strong evidence of a phenomenon that we label *Islamophobia without Muslims*: the smaller the factual presence of Muslim minorities in European societies, the higher the average support for a Muslim ban. Contact with immigrants can be considered an antidote to Islamophobia. In this regard, individuals in Western and Eastern Europe do not differ dramatically. Citizens that have contact with immigrants, make friends with people from other ethnicities, and perceive these contacts as beneficial tend to reject an immigration ban for Muslims. [77] Yet, since the antidote of contact is unequally distributed among European societies, one might argue that this individual-level effect lacks an amplifier in Eastern Europe. The sheer absence of Muslim communities in these parts of Europe translates into fewer contacts and friendships, and more sceptical perceptions of intergroup contacts. All these factors, however, accompany a social climate in which anti-Muslim prejudice has gained the upper hand (see Figure 1).

**Conclusion**

As our understanding of Islamophobia – which is indiscriminate, negative attitudes towards Muslims [78] – comes close to Allport’s (1971) description of prejudice, we searched for its causes in the light of social-psychological theories of prejudice and stereotyping. [79] Based upon our analysis of the European Values Survey and the European Social Survey, we feel confident in reporting five findings:

1. **Islamophobia is on the rise in Europe.** However, there is no sign of a rapid surge as anti-Muslim prejudice was already at a high level before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Anti-Muslim attitudes reached their (temporary) peak just before the so-called refugee crisis: the average European support for a Muslim ban in 2014 was approximately 25%. As there have been several terrorist attacks since 2015, it seems likely that this percentage provides a snapshot that is outdated.

2. **Islamophobia is most widespread in Eastern Europe.** Restrictive immigration policies vis-à-vis Muslims are quite popular in Eastern European countries, where the approval ratings for a Muslim ban are considerably higher than in the rest of Europe. On these grounds, the joint action taken by the Visegrád states to oppose binding quotas for the allocation of refugees is very much in line with public opinion.

3. **The social-psychological determinant patterns of Islamophobia do not vary dramatically between Eastern and Western European societies.** There are peculiarities in every country, but overall we can observe a clear pattern: perceptions of threat and ethnocentric worldviews must be considered as the core drivers of Islamophobia. Thus, realistic perceptions of threat have greater explanatory power than symbolic perceptions of threat. The diffuse fear of an alleged Islamicization of Europe is not the root cause of Islamophobia. Rather, anti-Muslim prejudice is to do with security concerns and anxieties about the economic consequences of immigration. The prime reason that Muslims face prejudice in contemporary Europe, however, is an exaggerated perception of the us-versus-them divide. Put bluntly: it is ethnocentrism, stupid!

4. **Our results indicate that the social-psychological dispositions of individuals had an impact on anti-Muslim prejudice long before the so-called refugee crisis.** The anti-Muslim rhetoric now prevalent in the public discourse in Europe simply revealed – and, presumably, reinforced – pre-existing patterns of prejudice and discrimination. The electoral success of right-wing extremist and populist parties during the past few years could be an indication of this trend.
Islamophobia does not need Muslims to be nearby at all. Muslim communities are virtually absent in most Eastern European societies. Nevertheless, we can observe that anti-Muslim prejudice is more widespread in Eastern than in Western Europe. How to explain Islamophobia without Muslims? Our empirical results are in line with the assumptions of the contact hypothesis. The factual size of Muslim communities and contact with immigrants affect the extent of Islamophobia in European societies. The underlying individual-level effect is not a Western European peculiarity. Individuals from both East and West are less susceptible to Islamophobia if they stay in contact with immigrants, make friends with people of other ethnicities, and perceive these contacts as beneficial. Intergroup contact in general acts as an antidote to Islamophobia. However, it is important to note that the antidote of contact is very unevenly distributed across Europe. To date, Eastern European countries have been comparatively unpopular choices for immigrants when they decide where to settle. What results is that Eastern European citizens have fewer opportunities of contact than their Western European counterparts. Less contact with immigrants, however, is the prime reason for a social climate in which Muslims become more likely to face prejudice. Above all, it is this societal-level factor that is the core driver (and presumably even intensifier) of the macro differences that we found between Eastern and Western Europe.

Notes
[1] Gert Pickel (Leipzig University, Faculty of Theology, Department of sociology of church and religion; <pickel@rz.uni-leipzig.de>).
[2] Cemal Öztürk (Leuphana University Lüneburg, Center for the Study of Democracy, PhD candidate in the doctoral program “Democracy under stress”; <oeztuerk@leuphana.de>).
[13] See Alexander Yendell’s introduction to this journal’s special issue on Islamophobia in Eastern Europe.
[18] Sabri Ciftci, Islamophobia and Threat Perceptions; Gert Pickel / Alexander Yendell, Islam als Bedrohung?
[27] Erik Bleich, What is Islamophobia, here p. 1584.
Nationalism and Perceptions of Threat – Ethnocentrism or Just a Lack of Contact?


[57] Robert Traut / Miloš Zeman: the hard line Czech leader fanning hostility to refugees.

[58] Daniel Boffey, Orbán claims Hungary is the last bastion against ‘Islamisation’ of Europe.


[77] The authors can provide additional empirical material on request.

[78] Erik Bleich, What is Islamophobia, here p. 1584.


Islamophobia in Eastern Europe: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications

A Different Dynamic? Explaining Prejudice Against Muslims in the Russian Federation: Islamophobia or Internalised Racial Hierarchy?

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Abstract
Prejudice against Islam and Muslims in Russia is shaped by distinctive national factors. These include the reactivated antagonism between Russia and the West, producing different representations of the “Islam versus the West” framework prevalent in Western Europe; state policies and official institutions which promote Russia as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state, and their interplay with diverse Russian nationalisms; and post-socialist upheavals which have produced high levels of insecurity and internal migration, especially from Muslim majority southern republics to Russia’s major cities. These conditions have produced high levels of general xenophobia and its public expression, including some use of Islamophobic discourses, and a widely shared hierarchy of ethnic preference. However, the Russian case challenges the theories of prejudice developed in Western Europe: individual interest theories find little support, group threat theories account for limited variance, and the urban-tolerant/rural-intolerant association is reversed. Furthermore, while there is a long history of Orientalist representation in Russian culture that shapes popular discourse, it is not clear that an essentialized, specifically “Muslim Other” has developed. This questions the validity of using the term “Islamophobia” in the Russian context.
Introduction: Xenophobia and Islamophobia in contemporary Russia

Attitudes to immigrants in Russia are far from welcoming. The ESS in 2012 included a question on whether people coming from other countries made a country a better or a worse place to live, measured on an 11-point scale, where 0 was a “worse place to live” and 10 a “better place to live”. The average response for Russia was 3.3. This made Russia and Cyprus the two countries with the strongest anti-immigrant attitudes in the ESS sample of 29 European states. [1]

On 24 July 2011, the Moskovskii Komsomolets, a major Moscow tabloid, ran an op-ed entitled “Black and Whites” that claimed that the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik had “rebelled against … the suicidal idea of multiculturalism, tolerance, and satiety”, and against a Norwegian government “blinded by treacherous tolerance”. [2] These quotations suggest that intolerant personal attitudes towards immigrants and expressions of intolerance in the media and public sphere are widespread in Russian society. Given these conditions, one might expect Islamophobia as a specific form of intolerance to be widespread, too, particularly given the ideological mobilization of Islam against Russian nationalism in the war in Chechnya and the use of terror tactics in Russian cities by Chechen secessionists. The reassertion of Russian Orthodox cultural hegemony and the proliferation of nationalisms in contemporary Russia might also point towards identification of the Muslim Other as a key cultural enemy; indeed, the presence of public demonstrations in several Russian cities in 2011–13 in support of Breivik [3] might be taken as evidence of such a development. Furthermore, the close historical conjunction of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 with the second Chechen war (1999–2000), and of the jihadist attacks on Western European cities in the mid-2000s (e.g. Madrid 2004, London 2005) with the Beslan School siege (2004) might suggest that the Islam-versus-the-West narratives which have gained considerable traction in Western Europe might also find resonance in Russia.

However, a closer look suggests that the situation is more complex; Western Islamophobic discourses have limited traction, and, while xenophobic attitudes are widespread in Russia, negative attitudes towards immigrants from Muslim ethnic backgrounds are (unlike in Western Europe [4]) at a similar level to negative attitudes towards people of non-European ethnicity such as the Chinese. [5] And, while the evidence is limited, hostility to-
wards Muslims as a religious group seems to be lower than hostility towards, for example, Americans. [6] Furthermore, the longstanding presence of Muslim minorities from a diversity of ethnic groups across the South and East of the Russian Federation, together with the presence of a Western ideological Other, raises the question of whether it is appropriate to use the category of Islamophobia at all, as it is not clear that an essentialized “Muslim Other”, as distinct from a broader racialized ethnic hierarchy, has crystallized in the popular imagination in the way that it has in Western Europe.

A complex situation with imperfect comparative data

Hostility to the West and antisemitism both contradict a straightforward alignment with Western European forms of anti-Islam sentiment, as does the considerable popularity of a state regime and a church hierarchy that are both highly critical of the West and supportive of the maintenance of the Russian federation as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional entity [7] in which Islam plays the role of a recognized, though subordinate, religion – indeed, Russia’s second religion. Hence, Russian nationalist groups are divided in their attitude to Islam; some Orthodox-nationalists, for example, see Muslims as potential allies against Zionism and the godless West, while others see militant Islam as a tool of the West and of Zionism in their attacks on Orthodox Russia. [8]

Given this ideological complexity, what do empirical studies tell us about the prevalence of Islamophobic attitudes in Russia? Unfortunately, large-scale attitudinal research on Islamophobia is limited; of the large international surveys, the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2005–9), which included a question on attitudes to Muslim neighbours, did not ask the question in Russia; Russia did not participate in the fourth wave (1999–2004) and, in the sixth wave (2010–14), the closest equivalent is a question on immigrant neighbours, which lacks specific reference to religion. Unfortunately again, Russia did not take part in the seventh wave (2012), which featured a detailed question on Muslim immigration in a special immigration module; again, the 2016 question “poor countries outside Europe” removes any specific reference to the religion of immigrants. Hence, we lack direct comparisons with Western Europe on attitudes to Muslims. However, surveys specific to Russia can be compared with these international instruments, and this evidence then triangulated with material from international reports, ethnographic studies, work on far-right and nationalist groups, and on the influence of Orientalist discourses in Russian culture, to produce a multi-perspectival picture.

Quantitative studies

Three recent papers are most pertinent. First, Gorodzeisky and Glikman [9] begin by describing a striking contrast between recent findings on the roots of anti-immigrant sentiment in Western societies and Russia:

across Western societies ... individual-level attributes, especially socioeconomic vulnerability and conservative views and ideologies, are likely to increase hostility and antagonism toward immigrant populations ... [whereas] in post-socialist Russia, the socioeconomic position of individuals – as well as conservative views and ideologies – are not effective in predicting anti-foreigner attitudes. [10]

To investigate why this should be the case, they use ESS data from 2006–12 to examine the correlates of anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia. The survey used a representative national sample, which enables comparison with the rest of Europe. The researchers examined the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and three sets of variables – those pertaining to individual socioeconomic characteristics, conservative views and ideologies, and assessment of state/collective vulnerability/functionality. They found that ethnic Russians expressed higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment than non-ethnic Russians (20% of the sample). They also found that “perceptions of collective vulnerability play a more important role in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority group than among the ethnic minority groups”, [11] while individual economic positioning and social conservatism were more important amongst the ethnic minorities. Thus, while the attitudes of ethnic minority groups towards immigrants were shaped by similar factors to those that have been found to be influential in Western Europe, ethnic Russian views stand out as being shaped more by insecurities related to the basic viability of the national state. This is theoretically interesting in terms of the dynamics of prejudice in societies undergoing national crises, and may also be relevant to the specific dynamics of Islamophobia in Russia. As stated above, however, the years in which
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Russia took part in the ESS do not enable the latter issue to be investigated directly. A study analyzed by Bessudov (2016) asked more detailed questions about people’s ethnic preferences than the international surveys available, enabling a more fine-grained analysis of prejudice against immigrants. He draws on a 2011 survey conducted by the Russian polling agency Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), which used a large sample of 24,500 people in 49 of the 83 Russian regions. The sample was not nationally representative, but multi-stage stratified sampling was used in each region to enable valid inter-regional comparisons, and the regions sampled represent 77% of the total population of the Russian Federation.

The study indicates the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment across the Federation. More than half (53%) would support banning permanent immigration from outside Russia. A striking and unexpected finding was the “high degree of inter-group consensus on the ethnic hierarchy of immigrant groups”. Thus, while, at least before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014–15, only 15% were negative about the prospect of Ukrainian neighbours, the figures rise to 53% for the Caucasus, 54% for SE Asia, 56% for S Asia, and 61% for the North Caucasus, despite the fact that the North Caucasus is part of Russia. The preference for more European ethnic neighbours was shared by all groups. Thus, not just Russians preferred ethnically similar Ukrainians, but the preferences of Tatars and Bashkirs are ordered in almost exactly the same way as the preferences of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Tajiks are more positive about Ukrainians and Moldovans than about immigrants from Central Asia and the North Caucasus.

This pattern suggests the internalization of a racialized ethnic hierarchy shared across the Russian regions, with those groups from Muslim majority backgrounds at the bottom of the pile. However, it is not possible to say from this data whether this is specifically Islamophobic, i.e. draws on an essentialized notion of Islam. Before considering data that may shed light on this question, two further findings from Bessudov’s study are worth noting for their possible implications for theorizing the causes and dynamics of prejudice.

The first is the finding that urban areas, the main centres of immigration, emerge as less tolerant than rural areas. This contrasts with Western European, and indeed North American, findings:

An important difference between Russia and Western Europe is the effect of location. While in Europe people living in cities are more cosmopolitan and tolerant than those who populate the countryside, in Russia the effect is the opposite. London, New York, and Moscow all attract a significant number of immigrants, but while the former two generally welcome diversity, Moscow remains one of the most xenophobic places in Russia.

Thus, in Western Europe a range of studies using different methods – from attitude surveys to voter preferences to qualitative area-based case studies – show that larger urban areas with higher concentrations of immigrants are more immigrant-friendly than smaller towns and rural areas with less diversity. This is counter-intuitive in terms of a tolerance or group-threat model of prejudice, because higher concentrations of migrants with different cultures would be deemed more disruptive of social life than lower concentrations, an explanation which would seem to fit the Russian case. But, against this model, it has been theorized that, over time, cities develop social coping mechanisms – multicultural institutions – and that these facilitate the integration of migrants and so reduce the anxieties of at least most city dwellers. In Russia, this process appears not to have occurred.

Second, while statistical models – especially those based on group-threat theory – can explain some of the variation in results across Russia, their explanatory power is more limited than in Western Europe:

A … fundamental difference between Russia and Western Europe is that in Russia, statistical models explain only a tiny part of the total variance of attitudes. While the direction of some effects is the same as in Western Europe, their size and predictive power are considerably smaller.

Thus, as predicted by group-threat theory, higher concentrations of immigrants are associated with higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, but account for only a small proportion of variation in the data:
While the direction of some effects is the same as in Western Europe, their size and predictive power are considerably smaller. After incorporating all the individual-level predictors and accounting for regional heterogeneity, our models leave about 95 per cent of the outcome variance unexplained.

It may be that, as Gorodzeisky and Glickman suggest, the specific dynamics that come into play when national disintegration is feared account for some of the variance.

But what of specifically Islamophobic prejudice? One of the few studies to examine hostility towards Muslims is discussed by Herrera and Kraus [13], who drew on a dataset of more than 11,000 individuals across 43 Russian regions in 2001–04. It should be noted that this precedes the Beslan school siege, and hence possibly an intensification of more specifically anti-Islam rhetoric; the separatists called themselves the *Riyah-us Salihem Brigade of Martyrs*. 90% of the sample described themselves as ethnically Russian. Researchers found hostility towards Muslims running at 12.4%, much lower than towards Roma (38%) or Chechens (33.8%), and slightly lower even than towards Americans (13%). This finding perhaps suggests that the label “Muslim” does not possess the same stigmatizing power in Russian racial hierarchies as it does in Europe and the US. A key factor in this may be the strong influence of the Russian state media, which may limit the impact of Islamophobic discourses circulating in the Western media.

This is not to say that specifically anti-Islam discourse is not present in Russia; on the contrary, as Shumsky argues, drawing on recent literary and historical [14] studies, the figure of the ‘despised Asian’ remains a constant in Russian culture over a number of centuries, from Pushkin’s and Lermonotov’s works in the first half of the nineteenth century to our own days, a time when it is being widely disseminated in the Russian public awareness in connection with the discourse about the ‘Chechyan’ and ‘Caucasian Mafia’. [15]

However, the lower level of prejudice expressed towards Muslims and ethnic groups of Muslim heritage in the national studies reviewed suggests that conditions do not make these narratives salient in a way that translates into specifically anti-Muslim prejudice – unlike in the Israeli case discussed by Shumsky, where the same traditions are drawn on by Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel to make sense of very different local conditions.

**Conclusions**

The case of Russia raises significant issues for the theories of Islamophobia that have been mostly developed in European and US contexts. First, Russia inverts widespread patterns in the distribution of prejudice, with cities experiencing higher levels of prejudice than the surrounding countryside, an inversion which may reflect the absence of the kind of multiculturalist integration policies present in many large cities in (at least Western) Europe and the US (even if abandoned or opposed by national governments [16]). Second, socio-economic status fails to act as a reliable predictor of levels of prejudice, which may reflect high levels of insecurity across society as a whole. Third, in contrast to most Western contexts, and despite similar terror tactics by groups claiming inspiration from Islam, Muslims are not the group that attracts the highest level of prejudice. Rather, ethnicity appears to trump religion as a marker of difference, with distance from a “core”, essentialized Russianness, defined as white, European, and Orthodox, seeming to be the best predictor of how much prejudice is directed against a group, and with geo-political factors also playing a role (Americans described as more disliked than Muslims, for example). Thus, it appears that, while the same underlying explanatory mechanisms are at work (e.g. levels of existential security and sense of group threat), the societal context through which they are mediated differs significantly, so that a Russian sense of ethnic hierarchy remains more important than a specifically anti-Muslim Islamophobia. A key factor in this may be the strong influence of the Russian state media, which mitigates the impact of Islamophobic discourses circulating in the Western media. However, where these seep in via the internet – as in the case of the far-right groups who mobilized in support of Breivik [17] – Russia’s sense of ethnic hierarchy, traditions of Orientalism, and absence of positive multicultural policies ensure that they find fertile ground.
Notes


[4] In the ESS 2014, those wishing to restrict Muslim immigration to few or none was higher than for any group except Roma http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/data extracted 31.10.2017


[7] ‘Putin has not incorporated racism and ethnic hostility into government policy. On the contrary, laws against incitement to ethnic hatred have been actively used to curb offenders.’ Johannes Due Enstad, “Glory to Breivik!”, p.781.


[12] Alexey Bessudnov, Ethnic Hierarchy and Public Attitudes towards Immigrants, Table 4


Abstract
The migration of Muslims against the background of globalization and conflicts in the Middle East, and the threat perceived by the Christian or non-religious majority population, highlight how the peaceful coexistence of different cultures and religions is in danger. In March 2016, Slovak elections highlighted the ugly manifestations of Islamophobia. Most troubling was the popularity and rise of the right-wing extremist and right-wing populist party Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia. The following article poses two research questions. First, to what extent did Islamophobia influence the 2016 elections? And, second, is the level of Islamophobia in Slovakia an accurate indicator of public sentiment, or instead part of a larger feeling of discontentment among the public? This article will use theories of post-factual politics from the field of political science. Empirical evidence in qualitative and quantitative forms of analysis will be presented, as well as the types of narrative constructed and observed within the Slovak media.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Eastern Europe, Slovakia, elections 2016
Introduction
The increased migration of Muslims against the background of globalization and conflicts in the Middle East, and the threat perceived by the Christian or non-religious majority population, highlights how the peaceful coexistence of people of different cultures and religions is in danger. As a trained political scientist working within the field of International Relations, the author has observed an increase in violence, and a mentality as well as a rhetoric that are harmful to liberal democratic traditions. Both political science and international relations are widely discussing and researching migration and the domestic challenges that it poses within the post-factual 2018 political landscape. Moreover, by taking a theoretical approach, I hope to provide useful information and evidence for professionals from other interdisciplinary approaches.

Since 2015, negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims have been very common in certain Eastern European countries and have led to political demands that are incompatible with the democratic requirement of religious freedom and EU anti-discrimination laws.

In March 2016, Slovak elections highlighted the ugly manifestations of Islamophobia. At the level of attitudes, behaviours, the media and political context, the 2016 campaign should have focused on the economy, tackling corruption, and providing an opportunity for the incumbent political party and prime minister to remain in power. Instead, it was dominated by the so-called refugee crisis. The various political parties spoke on this issue, often revealing negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. The Slovak media added an additional context and focus by stressing the incompatibility of Muslim refugees in Slovakia. Social media like Facebook revealed that anti-Islamist sentiment was very popular. Additionally, and most troubling, was the popularity and rise of right-wing extremist and right-wing populist individuals such as Marian Kotleba, leader of the far-right Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia, which finished fifth in the 2016 national elections and now holds 14 of 150 parliamentary seats. The perceived threat of Islam, both in their core programme and as part of their general xenophobic orientation, attracted and continues to attract supporters. An example of this are the unproven (post-truth) factual stories posted by the Slovak blogger Denník N, which has malicious and hateful comments of an Islamophobic nature.

Islamophobic Slovakia
The terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels had a significant impact on Slovak public opinion in terms of Islamophobic statements, with Prime Minister Robert Fico and like-minded politicians and media activists arguing that "Islam is not compatible with our culture". [1] Equating Islam as a religion with the phenomenon of terrorism intensified this issue within the context of the refugee crisis, which was used during the 2016 Slovak parliamentary elections. A further manifestation of Islamophobia can be observed in the media that serves the public. Rather than presenting positive information on inter-faith cooperation between the Islamic community in Slovakia and other Christian denominations, or the benefits of coexistence, the media presents negative stories of Islam by readers, listeners and viewers. Social media like Facebook revealed that anti-Islamist sentiment was very popular. Additionally, and most troubling, was the popularity and rise of right-wing extremist and right-wing populist individuals such as Marian Kotleba, leader of the far-right Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia, which finished fifth in the 2016 national elections and now holds 14 of 150 parliamentary seats. The perceived threat of Islam, both in their core programme and as part of their general xenophobic orientation, attracts and continues to attract supporters. An example of this are the unproven (post-truth) factual stories posted by the Slovak blogger Denník N, which has malicious and hateful comments of an Islamophobic nature.
suggested that the demonstrations were acts of anti-terrorism. [2] [3]

As the European migrant crisis continues, the attitudes of EU citizens towards ethnic minorities continue to shift and evolve. Although discrimination clearly remains widespread in some regions, the majority of respondents also agreed that new measures should be introduced to protect visible minorities; while this is surely encouraging, Islamophobia is, as the map below clearly shows, at its strongest in the EU in Central Europe and especially in Slovakia; thus, the Slovaks are the most Islamophobic and racist population in the EU. Xenophobic groups use people’s fear of the unknown to stir up trouble, and this is what we are witnessing in Central Europe, and particularly in Slovakia with the rise of a far-right political party. Therefore, two research questions emerge:

1. To what extent did Islamophobia influence the 2016 elections?
2. Is the level of Islamophobia in Slovakia an accurate indicator of public sentiment, or instead part of a larger feeling of discontentment among the public?

This paper will use theories of post-factual politics to describe how the Slovak election in 2016 was framed according to emotional appeals disconnected from policy detail. The key difference between the post-factual and the traditional contesting of facts lies in how the former downgrades facts and expert opinion because it is interested in emotional appeal. In recent years, post-factual politics has been viewed as a contemporary problem, as something that has arisen in, for example, the US, the UK, and Russia. Driving factors are also the combination of the social media and its ubiquity, 24-hour news and more
often than not a false balance in news reporting. [4] Jennifer Hochschild, professor of government at Harvard University, has described this rise as a return to the media practices of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. [5] While the Internet and the World Wide Web were widely heralded in the 1990s as beneficial to democracy because they would now make information accessible and cheaper, and allow the public to participate in areas that they were previously excluded from, developments in social media in the 2000s accelerated this trend. Mass mobilization allowed various national publics to bypass oppressive authoritarian state control and fuel popular revolution, as in Ukraine and Egypt. However, negative information has also flourished. Authoritarian regimes have responded either through censorship (China) or by spreading negative information through social media trolls and bots (Russia). This was on display in the US presidential election of 2016. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult in the marketplace of ideas to counter negative information. Put simply, all possible sources are viewed as credible.

As Russian-British journalist, TV producer, and writer Peter Pomerantsev wrote in the British cultural magazine *Granta*, “the digital disruption of the traditional media and traditional journalism – the collapse of newspapers, the flight from flow TV news, and the wildfire success of new media like Google, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter – not just fragments the news stream and creates algorithm-supported echo chambers, where people on the basis of their internet behaviour increasingly only are confronted with opinions and worldviews they already agree with”. Once it has been accepted that knowledge is a type of power – undemocratic and illegitimate – “then the liberation that postmodernism inherited as a project from the Enlightenment quickly turns into a wholesale rejection of facts, arguments, knowledge and the associated institutions. … liberation must be looked for through feelings and the body, which are revolutionary per se…. [and this philosophy] has seeped down from universities, out into media, advertisement agencies and the communication industry – and from there into politics. It is a worldview where every version of events is just another narrative, where lies can be excused as ‘an alternative point of view’ or ‘an opinion’, because ‘it’s all relative’ and ‘everyone has their own truth’”. [6] While the term “post-truth politics” was coined by the blogger David Roberts in a blog post for Grist on 1 April 2010 to denote “a political culture in which politics, specifically public opinion and media narrative, becomes disconnected from policy”, [7] it is in fact not new. Indeed, the term was first used in a 1992 essay by the late Serbian-American playwright Steve Tesich in *The Nation*. Tesich wrote that, following Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, and the Persian Gulf War, “we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world”; [8] Ralph Keyes used the term “post-truth era” in 2004 in his book by that title; [9] and Colin Crouch used the phrase “post-democracy” in 2004 in his book *Post-democracy* to refer to a model of politics where “elections certainly exist and can change governments”, but where “public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams”. [10]

In 2015, media and politics scholar Jayson Harsin coined the term “regime of post-truth” to encompass many aspects of post-truth politics as he argued that a convergent set of developments created the conditions of post-truth society: the political communication informed by cognitive science, which aims at managing perception and belief of segmented populations through techniques like microtargeting which includes the strategic use of rumors and falsehoods; the fragmentation of modern, more centralized mass news media gatekeepers, which have largely repeated one another's scoops and their reports; the attention economy marked by information overload and acceleration, user-generated content and fewer society-wide common trusted authorities to distinguish between truth and lies, accurate and inaccurate; the algorithms which govern what appears in social media and search engine rankings, based on what users want (per algorithm) and not on what is factual; and news media which have been marred by scandals of plagiarism, hoaxes, propaganda, and changing news values. These developments have occurred on the background of economic crises, downsizing and favoring trends toward more traditional tabloid stories and styles of reporting, known as tabloidization. [11]

The Slovak parliamentary election in 2016 saw the use of post-factual reality. The use of emotional connection, i.e. fear of Muslim immigrants, was on full display and was packaged within the narrative of security. Furthermore, Slovaks hold similar opinions to the Czechs and Poles. The then-Prime Minister Robert Fico echoed Czech President Miloš Zeman's comment that the Czechs would not welcome Muslim immigrants into the country; he also echoed the sentiment expressed in Poland that the country would be willing to accept only Christian refugees, with Fico justifying this by saying that there are no mosques in Slovakia. The Slovak election saw the use of microtargeting in the media landscape, as well as of tabloidization. Despite there being no terrorist threats, and despite the presence of a very small Muslim population that had been assimilated into Slovak culture and society since the 1970s, there was a fear of Muslims.

The effective use by a far-right extremist political party, Kotleba-Ludová strana Naše Slovensko (Kotleba-ĽSNS) drew comparisons to Slovakia’s fascist history. The party, Kotleba-ĽSNS, was often referred to as the dark horse of the election. The fact that it performed better in actual votes than mainstream political parties surprised members of the media, international commentators, and scholars. The additional fact that some Slovak political parties with established political histories were unable to reach the 5% threshold to enter parliament is something that political pundits and academics in Slovakia will explore and debate for a long time.

Issues that fuel fear and hate, coupled with harsh rhetoric, are often precursors to extremism. “Extremism is fertile ground for radicals and the challenges for democratic forces”. [15] Despite the fact that Kotleba-ĽSNS, was not visible as a political party in public opinion research in the months preceding the election, it managed to reach the electoral threshold and thereby gained seats in parliament. The success and popularity of Kotleba-ĽSNS are based largely on identity politics.

Politically constructed identities signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded on the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, or party affiliation, political formations usually aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context. Members of that constituency assert their distinctiveness with the goal of greater self-determination. Kotleba-ĽSNS – and, to a larger degree, Slovakia, too – has moved from full normative conformity with the West to an attitude that is rather ambiguous. A few Western principles and norms are accepted unconditionally, while others have been subverted or rewritten in political discourse. For the purpose of this article, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory is used as an analytical tool to understand the 2016 Slovak parliamentary elections.

However, no Slovak political party had more success than Marian Kotleba and his party in using the negative mood of the Slovak electorate, and in using new media such as Facebook for political marketing. Arguably, there is a direct link here to Foucault, [16] and his discussion of social power struggles, and how historical forms of discourse have been shaped. [17] Distancing itself from mainstream parties and distinguishing itself by embracing rhetoric and supporting policies highlighting the difference between Slovakia and the ‘Other’ were simple and concise. Such elements were present on Kotleba-ĽSNS’s campaign pillars and in its campaign manifesto.

In using the fear of the other, i.e. immigrants, Kotleba-ĽSNS took advantage of an issue that the mainstream media and mainstream political parties were using as well. The immigration topic was a useful tool for all the parties, but it held more resonance for Kotleba-ĽSNS as it argued that it was the party that would truly protect Christian Slovakia. Kotleba-ĽSNS also used popular anti-establishment sentiments to its advantage. Referring to Slovak members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as traitors who had voted in favour of the EU migrant quotas, Kotleba-ĽSNS played on Slovak citizens’ sensitivity on this issue with the simple slogan, “Stop Immigrants!”, as shown below.

The issue of migration and of the Roma community, both sensitive issues for Slovak voters, were at the centre of the campaign. Since Kotleba-ĽSNS was absent
from the mainstream coverage of these issues and from
the responses of the mainstream Slovak political parties,
the party was able to dominate the narrative in its an-
swers online. And, although the answers offered by Kotle-
ba-ĽSNS were unrealistic and simplistic, they nevertheless
resonated with the Slovak voter. This was not simply a
case of uneducated voters and easy appeal. The explana-
tion offers a direct link to ethnonationalism.

Political parties in Eastern Europe have a historical
predisposition towards ethnonationalism, which affects
the discursive strategies adopted by competing political
parties. Mainstream political parties often co-opt certain
messages and rhetoric used by the far or radical right to
win additional votes. It is no surprise, then, that this is
what occurred in Slovakia. Kotleba-ĽSNS was successful in
creating the dominant discourse on social media, mainly
Facebook, which is followed more than television and the
print media in Slovakia. Kotleba-ĽSNS had 70,000 follow-
ers by 1 March 2016. [19]

Kotleba-ĽSNS was very successful at using rhetoric
with simple mottos and updates on their profile, and at
offering solutions to domestic problems, such as corrup-
tion, that the mainstream parties largely ignored. Further-
more, Kotleba-ĽSNS was effective in using anti-EU and
anti-migrant sentiment, the party branding members of
parliament thieves and stating that it did not want any
migrants in Slovakia. Initiatives on both these issues, such
as a petition against migrants, appeared on the party’s
Facebook page. Moreover, Kotleba-ĽSNS argued that it
had solutions to problems such as the migration crisis
and issues to do with the Roma people, and it used dra-
matic headlines as status updates which attracted atten-

↑

Image 1. Kotleba-ĽSNS campaign billboard, “STOP Immigration”
Source: Medzicas.sk http://medzicas.sk/marian-kotleba-v-slobodnom-vysielaci/
tion and thousands of ‘likes’ and ‘reposts’. An immediate result was voter support for Kotleba-ĽSNS, which indicates how successful the strategy was in gaining votes. The chart below shows the increase in visits and “likes” for the party.

Populist rhetoric and actions are not new tactics. Months before the election, Prime Minister Fico and his party, Smer, distributed large welfare handouts, and Smer built its campaign solely on protecting Slovakia, but failed to differentiate itself from Kotleba and other competitors. Moreover, Fico was unable to channel the anxiety that he had helped to create.

But the most effective messages that Kotleba-ĽSNS disseminated were opposition to migration and what the response to the migration crisis should be. Exit polling showed a high percentage of young first-time voters. Focus polling agencies showed that 17.3% of Kotleba-ĽSNS voters had never voted before. If this percentage is applied to official election results, Kotleba-ĽSNS received around 209,000 votes, with approximately 36,000 votes from first-time voters. In comparison, the Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS) received around 21,000 votes from first-time voters aged 18–21. Kotleba-ĽSNS also received the majority of votes from manual labourers and former supporters of the government party, Smer. In exit polling, 8% of voters said that they had voted for Kotleba-ĽSNS solely on the basis of the issue of immigration. [19]

Zuzana Kusá, a sociologist with the Slovak Academy of Sciences, told the Slovak Spectator that “Kotleba’s party in parliament is the result of chronic social and economic insecurity, lack of perspectives, and a chronic lack of integrating values in our society”. [19] Moreover, after the elections, the Data of Statistics Office showed that Kotleba had received support in almost all districts in Slovakia and had attracted between 6 and 13% of voters, which is enough to enter parliament. Tibor Madleňák stated: “This reflects the broad support that the party got: first-time voters, protest voters, and former non-voters who are relatively equally present in most regions”. [19]

The issues discussed on the Facebook page of Kotleba-ĽSNS and the rhetoric used by Marion Kotleba pushed the boundaries of both the law and normative values. A key example of this boundary pushing was organized marches with party members wearing uniforms resembling the uniform of the Hlinka Guard, a wartime fascist organization. The DEREX (Demand For Right-Wing Extremism) Index, which surveys prejudice, reports that over 10% of the Slovakian population supports right-wing extremist groups. [20].

Figure 2. Kotleba-ĽSNS on Facebook
Source: Socialbakers
The online world loves to hate

Since the introduction of social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, political parties and candidates have tried to use such media to their advantage. This is important when mainstream media outlets do not offer visibility in the modern era to certain political parties or candidates. What is also important for far-right political parties is that social media has become a very useful tool to target specific voters through online campaigns. Such targeting offers the opportunity to radicalize people, something that has been explored by Behr, Reding, Edwards and Gribbon in Radicalization in the Digital Era, [22] by COPS in Online Radicalization to Violent Extremism, [23] and by Helmus, York and Chalk in Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism. [24] Moreover, these new forms of media attract mainstream media attention [25] and enter the public discourse.

Analysis of the media coverage given to Marian Kotleba and to his party during the time period analyzed (from 1 January 2016 until the day of the election on 5 March 2016), shows that his visibility was 19 times greater than that of his own political party: there were 831 media messages on Marina Kotleba and 43 media messages on ĽS-NS. [25] Despite this difference, there were also similarities in media coverage.

One fundamental similarity was that both candidate and party were more visible online via social media than they were in the mainstream Slovak media. This also applied to the variety of media formats and to the type of coverage (national or regional coverage in print, online, or on television), with Kotleba receiving 72% or 600 media messages as opposed to ĽSNS, with 36% or 36 media messages. [25] Additionally, media coverage varied, from drawing attention to ĽSNS candidates to promoting the main pillars of its electoral manifesto. Promotion of the party and its views was conducted through alternative methods, such as a party newspaper and online. And, while there is no statistical evidence that the media coverage helped Kotleba-ĽSNS to achieve such positive election results, there is no doubting the power of online media.

The 2016 parliamentary elections saw the use of ethnocentric discursive strategies and cultural othering were certainly not the preserve of the radical right, or indeed of right-wing parties, as recent scholarship on far-right parties in the region has shown. [28] What is perhaps most intriguing is how the Slovak National Party, once viewed as extreme and which has actively exploited anti-minority sentiment, despite its participation in the first Fico government (2006–2010), had by 2016 been rebranded and was viewed in contrast to Kotleba-ĽSNS as a mainstream party in spite of its anti-Roma, anti-Hungarian ethnonationalist views. While both Kotleba-ĽSNS and SNP effectively used the migration crisis for political capital, what is disturbing is the fact that, after the elections, these two radical right-wing parties with ethnonationalist views control nearly one-fifth of the seats in the Slovak parliament, with the party again a member of the ruling coalition and its party leader, Andrej Danko, holding the position of parliamentary speaker.

In addition, the 2016 campaign saw other political parties such as Smer and SaS co-opt similar ethnocentric positions as part of their discursive strategy, and were aided in doing so by the Slovak mainstream media. This legitimizes the arguments of an extreme party such as Kotleba-ĽSNS, and, in the case of Smer, saw its leader and Slovakia’s current prime minister, Robert Fico, exploit the migration crisis in a way that conflicted with the mainstream discourse of Western Europe and of European leaders in Brussels.

Fico stated his ethnocentric position in comments that he made in January 2016 when he offered a culturalist, or rather a culturally particular, interpretation of identities that conflicted with Western universalist principles from which obligations towards refugees derive. Fico’s criticism centred on the European ideology of multiculturalism. “The idea of multicultural Europe failed”, he declared in January 2016, “and the natural integration of people who have a different way of life, way of thinking, cultural background, and most of all religion is not possible”. [29] Moreover, on the issue of religion, Fico argued that the formation of “compact Muslim communities” in Slovakia would breed security risks similar to the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Such a culturalist vision with an emphasis on religion was effectively used for the domestic audience as the Slovak government initially agreed to accept a small number of Christian refugees because, as it was pointed out, Slovakia was a Christian country and therefore could not tolerate “an influx of 300,000 to
400,000 Muslim immigrants who would start building mosques all over the place”. [30] While Slovakia’s political establishment did not participate in the Western European discourse, and instead promoted its own vision of European identity, the way that it framed issues such as the migration crisis did promote Slovakia’s vision of European identity.

**The campaign against the ‘Other’**
The Slovak National Party stated in its 2016 election manifesto its intention to protect “Slovak ethnic, cultural, confessional and social integrity from illegal migrants, coming from a different ethnic, cultural, religious and social environment”. Conspiracy theories saw a link between migrants and a threat to Europe’s integrity. Boris Kollár, a conservative anti-establishment populist and leader of the political party SME Rodina (We Are the Family), claimed that the migrants were actually part of a “controlled” invasion of Europe. Alongside the right-wing populists, however, the use of threats was also duly exploited by Smer, which actively employed a “We protect Slovakia” slogan in its campaign. [29]

Robert Fico used the slogan effectively, coupling it with simple statements that touched on the security threat for Slovaks, or on the fact that the security of Slovaks had a higher priority than the rights of migrants, or on the fact that the government monitors Muslims. As a result, Smer had increased its percentage by seven points in opinion polls by the end of 2015, clearly confirming that such a confrontational approach paid political dividends. [29] The migration crisis offered new opportunities for political othering; an understanding of Europe as a Christian civilization in need of protection from cultural threats does signal a less inclusive stance. Such a conservative vision upholds the idea of Europe but the idea of Europe that it upholds is different. In terms of immediate practical policy, this is a selective choice, enjoying the benefits of EU membership without fulfilling all its re-
quirements. Furthermore, as to identity-building, ethnocentrism is a step away from normative conformity, but a step towards something else, perhaps partial identification and subversion. Finally, this approach is surely negative for Slovak domestic politics as it opposes EU unity on shared issues, and undermines Western values.

Conclusion

The 2015 migration crisis influenced the Slovak parliamentary elections in March 2016, and the responses to the crisis changed the political landscape. Alternative media, and in particular social media, are powerful tools to reach the voter. Populist candidates will always find an audience receptive to their message. Kotleba-L'SNS took that populist message and combined it with its anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and homophobic rhetoric. Finally, post-truth politics as a political culture forces debate framed largely by appeals to emotions disconnected from the details of policy. Sadly, this is what we observe in Slovakia on the issue of Islamophobia.

As to the extent to which Islamophobia influenced the 2016 elections, the answer is arguably that Islamophobia played a role in motivating voters to vote for a racist party. Also, mainstream Slovak parties were assisted by co-opting ethnonationalist sentiment. As to the second hypothesis, it is less clear. With regard to the parliamentary elections, it can be argued that Islamophobia was part of a larger wave of public discontentment and therefore not an accurate indicator. However, polling from the European Commission-Public Opinion [32] indicates that Slovak public sentiment is clearly Islamophobic. Furthermore, Amnesty International has criticized the public discourse surrounding refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, [33] and illiberal groups display an increased ability to organize themselves and mobilize citizens, most notably young voters. [34] The fallout from the refugee crisis continues to fuel discriminatory sentiment.

Notes


Islamophobia on Facebook: The Current “Migration Crisis” and the Songs of the Czech Singers Critical of Islam, Muslims and Refugees. [1]

Přemysl Rosůlek [2] (University of West Bohemia, Czech Republic)

Abstract
This article focuses on the Czech singers who sing songs critical of the “migration crisis”, and also on the related activities of these singers on Facebook. The main goal of the article is to introduce the texts of the songs that went viral on YouTube (i.e. reached between 8,000 and 500,000 thousand viewers), and to analyze how these singers imagine the contemporary “migration crisis” and the related terms “Islam” and “Muslim immigration”. The article is framed by two theoretical concepts – the celebritization of politics, and post-truth politics. One song was excluded from the group of songs critical of Islam since it was directed rather at the smallness of the Czech nation. The remaining four texts of the songs analyzed here each has a critical attitude towards different aspects of the “migration crisis”, although these texts vary significantly. For example, one emphasizes the image of huge crowds of people entering the country; others stress either the threat of the future Islamicization of society or the need for people to mobilize at the European level; or, finally, one portrays an Arab from Syria as a dangerous woman chaser.

Keywords:
migration crisis; Islam; Muslims; refugees; Islamophobia; Czech Republic; singers; texts of songs; celebritization of politics; post-factual politics
Islamophobia on Facebook: The Current “Migration Crisis” and the Songs of the Czech Singers Critical of Islam, Muslims and Refugees. [1]

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Introduction
Public debate in the Czech Republic over the past few years has been shaped by events revolving around the term “migration crisis”, a term that I place between quotation marks because the Czech Republic has long been far removed from the interests of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. The same applies to Europe generally. It is true that the old continent has contended with an unprecedented wave of migrants, but, in contrast to the high number of people across the world who have had to leave their homes recently, the number of people arriving in Europe is still relatively low.

Unlike in the Western part of Europe, there was until recently very little academic research on Islamophobia in the Czech Republic and in Central and Eastern Europe generally. [3] Nevertheless, since the issue labelled a “migration crisis” emerged and then gained ground in the politics, public discourse and media of Central and Eastern Europe, the situation has also influenced scholars in the social sciences, who have now begun to analyze the various manifestations of Islamophobia in regional politics and society.

The aim of this article is to analyze the forms and manifestations of Islamophobia in the Czech Republic. In particular, I will analyze the texts of songs critical of Islam, Muslims or migration within the wider context of the current migration crisis, and also examine what the singers of these songs posted on their Facebook accounts when these posts are directly related to the songs analyzed. I will take into account only the compositions created between the beginning of June 2015 and the end of June 2017 and sung by these singers. (I provide English translations of the songs). I analyze the following three elements of the texts of the songs: their image of (1) the migration crisis, (2) Islam, and (3) Muslim refugees. I then place the resulting analysis in a theoretical framework based on the concepts of the celebritization of politics and of post-factual politics. In the era of mass media and social networks, the process of celebritization leaves the cultural domain and is instead often linked to the public sphere. [7] Celebrities do not hesitate to engage with politics, [8] a field that is now less ideological, but consequently more personalized and celebritized. [9] The post-truth era – or, perhaps, post-factual world – is a phenomenon characterized by a focus on emotions as well as by the absence of people checking the sources of the information that they consume. Rational socio-economic issues are not attractive to the media and its recipients, but the easy slogans of populists flourish.

Facebook commentaries posted by the singers are not quoted as endnotes in this text. Since there are too many Facebook posts under scrutiny readers can find quoting of the sources directly in the text in the feature of singer’s surname and date of posting (e.g. Hejma 22.06.2015).

Song lyrics
The strong anti-immigration discourse which has resonated in Czech politics, society and culture in recent years found an outlet in many songs written between 2015 and 2017. It should be mentioned, however, that a band called Ortel became the first successful group to sing a song criticizing Islam in as early as 2013. The main message of their track “The Mosque” is: “For Allah’s
glory they chop off your head". This seems to point only at radicals. However, the song also expresses scepticism towards ethnic pluralism ("I’ll only say a couple of words, I don’t want a multi-culti world"), as well as religious pluralism ("In the land of the Christians there stands a mosque / let one of you give me an answer / why don’t they build a church in the Arab lands?"). Other passages in the text directly attack the very essence of Islam: "Where hatred is a virtue and murder is an act of obedience / where your wife can be stoned to death just like that / where truth is determined by explosives / there a black flower blooms and Mohamed is its name". [10] It is interesting that Ortel finished in second place (after Kabát) in the ‘Music Group’ category in the Czech Nightingale Mattoni Award during the period (2015–2016) studied here. Moreover, Tomáš Ortel, the band’s frontman and someone who had previously played in the neo-Nazi band Conflict 88, came third in the ‘Singer of the Year’ category, and then second one year later. “The Mosque” was the year’s most-listened-to song and was, according to Ortel, a reaction to “the flow of orthodox Muslims to Europe and European cities, where they build their neighbourhoods, that is to say, in quotation marks, ‘their ghettos’”. He continues: “We freaked out that it’s gonna happen here as well and that’s why ‘The Mosque’ and its controversial video were created.” [11] It should be noted that “The Mosque” (2013) was written before the period studied here (2015–2017). The same can be said for Daniel Landa’s “Over Afghanistan” (2009) and Ivan Mládek’s “Mosques of Prague” (2000), neither of which are critical of Islam. On the contrary, Mládek emphasized that his song was misunderstood and misused, that it was not meant as a criticism of refugees, and that it pointed instead at the “littleness” of the Czech nation. [12] With regard to Landa, we might recall that a song entitled “The Aryan” appeared in the music world and on his Facebook page at the time of the migration crisis. He sings the song with Sediq Shahab in both the Czech and the Pashto language, and presents it as “help for cultured Afghans in the fight against goblins”. The song’s lyrics ("We are born as Aryans and proud of our ancestors", “We are one race, one race of Aryans," “we are honest, cultured and united”) are in no way critical of Islam and are therefore not included in my analysis. It should also be mentioned that, for the purposes of our research, we do not deem it important whether the singer is the author of the song or whether he or she merely covers it. Moreover, as there have been altogether five songs aimed at refugee crisis which were composed between 2015–2017 and could be therefore considered for our research, it is important to say that the only Facebook account that did not have any of the below stated songs presented in any way was the Facebook account of Jarek Nohavica. These are the songs by Slávek Janoušek, Dominika Myslivcová, Vilém Čok, Jarek Nohavica, and Olivie Žižková that were released during the time period that I focus on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Singer</th>
<th>Title of song</th>
<th>Presented on</th>
<th>No. of views on YouTube*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slávek Janoušek</td>
<td>Tutti frutti ramadan</td>
<td>9/2015</td>
<td>7,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominika Myslivcová</td>
<td>We want no change here</td>
<td>8/2016</td>
<td>332,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilém Čok</td>
<td>Crowds of crowds</td>
<td>8/2016</td>
<td>38,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarek Nohavica</td>
<td>Baraba is touching my woman</td>
<td>8/2016</td>
<td>85,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olivie Žižková</td>
<td>Breathe, Europe</td>
<td>8/2016</td>
<td>559,378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No. of viewers up to 31.7.2017

Slávek Janoušek, who muddied the waters of public discourse when he premiered his new song live on the Good Morning show on Česká televize on 11.9.2015, represents a special case. He sings about coming home from work and finding a refugee from North Africa munching on peppers from his greenhouse. Since he is a man with a humanitarian outlook, he decides to keep the little black refugee that looks like Barack Obama for a trial period, allowing him to stay for the time being with his dog Azor in the kennel. He also indicates what kind of a quid pro quo he expects from him:

You gonna take turns in guarding / Tutti frutti Ramadan / Take turns in guarding / There's breakfast for both of you in a bowl / Tutti frutti Ramadan / Here's your breakfast.

A passage later in the text highlights the fact that it is quite normal today to have a black person at home; that having a refugee at home is better than having a pet budgie; and that he will in fact take in another two or three refugees from the shelter. In the last verse, he walks hap-
At the time of the migration crisis, this song became the first major media story in connection with Czech celebrities, and Slávek Janoušek is the only singer that dedicated most of his Facebook posts in September 2015 to explaining that the song is not actually racist and that he was misunderstood by some listeners and journalists. After sharing the song on his Facebook page on 11 September 2015, he responded to one of his critics by explaining that the song is sung “in role”, and that he took the part of a dunce, of “someone who behaves like a goon and yet feels he is being helpful ... I’m not a racist, I’m not ridiculing refugees” (Janoušek commentary 12.9.2015 in: Janoušek 11.9.2015). He also argues with the authors of articles that criticize him, mainly with Petr Bittner, who wrote an article, “The Czech Perspective is Gone”, published in Deníkreferendum.cz. To defend himself, Janoušek shared the full copy of an article published by Lidové noviny entitled “The Last Word ‘Refugees in the cupboard’”, written by Tomas Baldýnský (Janoušek 19.9.2015), and later sharing two quotes on his Facebook page from readers of Bittner’s article who understood the song “Tutti Frutti Ramadan” as being an expression of irony and exaggeration. To this, Janoušek added: “Finally! Some people actually understood” (Janoušek 15.9.2015).

In stark contrast, the lyrics of the songs sung by Žižková and Myslivcová express the fear of an influx of people and the Islamicization that might follow.

Dominika Myslivcová links the question of mass migration and radical Islamism in the lyrics to her song appropriately entitled: “We Want No Change Here” (Myslivcová 9.8.2016, Myslivcová 2016a):

(...I don't want to go out covered in a robe and scarf / why change my pink traditions because of someone else / I want to live this dream life for some time to come / don't want to change it because of those who come to our republic / I speak for all women / who like to doll themselves up / who decide for themselves what to wear / who don't want these changes / we want no changes here ... / it's us who were born here / we want to decide what happens in our country / I voice my opinion and refuse to be mute / I want to peacefully drink my frapp. on the beach wearing my bikini / and see one man with one woman only. [14]

After impacting on the media with “We Want No Change Here” (and likewise with the video-blog “A Walk Through Teplice”), Myslivcová published a post on Facebook where she strenuously denied that she was xenophobic (Myslivcová 10.8.2016):

I am absolutely tolerant of other cultures and just as I “sing” in the song [“We Want No Change Here”]. It should be up to us alone to decide how we dress, because if these “evil” ones get here it might be that we will no longer be the ones deciding. Only a stupid and intolerant person would call this racism and xenophobia. Unfortunately you’re looking for racism absolutely everywhere, but I’m not even sure on which side the racism actually is ...

Similarly, Olivie Žižková, in her song “Breathe, Europe”, calls the migration crisis an “invasion”, and demands through her lyrics the active defence of Europe against Islamicization (in: Žižková 3.8.2016): [15]

There’s no time to wait, why be afraid of them. / Islamic burkas, Jihad pulling the strings. / Invasion is growing, we need to get stronger. / We’ll have to get up and start to fight hard. / Breathe, Europe and look into the future. Don’t let them thrash you, return of democracy! / We are strong and we have faith. / We can’t even laugh or fall asleep in peace. / Resist, Europe, don’t let them shoot you. / Their task is to go on a bloody trip. / We refuse to be mere sheep. / And to our own slaughter voluntarily march.

It is interesting that, immediately after the song’s release, Žižková shared a text on her Facebook account from the portal Boomba.cz entitled: “A Racist Recorded A Music Video in Which She Incites the Nation to Hatred. She’s Facing a Jail Sentence!” Next to it, she writes a post poking fun at her sweet tooth, and asking her fans to send her donuts in jail (Žižková 3.8.2016).

The lyrics of a song presented and sung by Vilém Čok, “Crowds of Crowds”, recalls with apprehension the
eral context of the migration crisis), a total of five singers drew attention to themselves by introducing their own songs.

As we have found, however, Slávek Janoušek (just like Ivan Mládek and Daniel Landa) cannot be counted among the “critics” of Islam, Muslims, or the present-day “migration crisis”. The question might be asked whether some parts of the text of his song “Tutti frutti ramadan” is persuasive enough for critics of Islamophobic tendencies that it was composed as an ironic comment on the smallness of the Czech nation. In fact, the song “Mosques of Prague” (2000), sung by Ivan Mládek in as early as 2000, has also been misunderstood at the time of the contemporary “migration crisis”, and has been misused by critics of Islam. Opposition to the song has come both from intellectuals and the wider public, for whom the idea of a link between the singer Janoušek and xenophobic discourse was quite unlikely. Interestingly, Janoušek had to make considerable efforts on his Facebook page to persuade the public that he is not a racist. Yet, there is a question as to why so many Czechs considered the text of this song as beyond the pale for joking about refugees from Africa.

As for the negative image of the migration crisis, Vilém Čok has written, in the “Crowds of Crowds”, the strongest of all the texts of the songs analyzed here, invoking associations with a mass invasion. However, he hopes that “One, two, three, four millions / Crowds of laws / Crowds of fallacies / Crowds of offspring / Crowds of immigrants / Let’s keep our nation’s identity / Each spring will bring new patriots / The state is the proof and you know it / Let’s all the more get together / Let’s all the more get together / With the CROSS let’s get closer together (see Čok 29.8.2016).

Finally, Jarek Nohavica’s song “Baraba Is Touching My Woman” ridicules refugees, describing them as uncontrolled men that must be disposed of to protect men’s wives and girlfriends:

Shabadabada, shabadabada, shabadabada. / An Arab is touching my woman, / I might gouge out his eyes. / I’m gonna kill the Baraba, the Baraba, Alibaba from Syria. / An Arab is touching my woman, I might gouge out his eyes. / I’m gonna kill the Baraba, the Baraba, Alibaba, if he doesn’t kill me first. [16]

Conclusion
Above, the theoretical concepts of the celebritization (of politics) in the era of post-factual politics have been discussed. In this context it is important to point out that all of the singers analyzed in this study have a status of a celebrity singer, except Myslicová. But, only a few of these celebrity singers are of first category in the Czech Republic (e.g. Jarek Nohavica). Others are rather generational celebrities for teenagers (e.g. Dominika Myslicová) or for the older generation of rock-music fans (e.g. Vilém Čok).

At the culmination of the debate surrounding the migration crisis in the Czech context (and not in the general context of the migration crisis), a total of five singers drew attention to themselves by introducing their own songs.

As we have found, however, Slávek Janoušek (just like Ivan Mládek and Daniel Landa) cannot be counted among the “critics” of Islam, Muslims, or the present-day “migration crisis”. The question might be asked whether some parts of the text of his song “Tutti frutti ramadan” is persuasive enough for critics of Islamophobic tendencies that it was composed as an ironic comment on the smallness of the Czech nation. In fact, the song “Mosques of Prague” (2000), sung by Ivan Mládek in as early as 2000, has also been misunderstood at the time of the contemporary “migration crisis”, and has been misused by critics of Islam. Opposition to the song has come both from intellectuals and the wider public, for whom the idea of a link between the singer Janoušek and xenophobic discourse was quite unlikely. Interestingly, Janoušek had to make considerable efforts on his Facebook page to persuade the public that he is not a racist. Yet, there is a question as to why so many Czechs considered the text of this song as beyond the pale for joking about refugees from Africa.

As for the negative image of the migration crisis, Vilém Čok has written, in the “Crowds of Crowds”, the strongest of all the texts of the songs analyzed here, in invoking associations with a mass invasion. However, he hopes that “One, two, three, four millions/Crowds of laws/Crowds of fallacies/Crowds of offspring/Crowds of immigrants” will result in a renascence of our national identity and will bring new patriots to the fore. Also, the song “Breathe, Europe”, sung by Olivie Žižková, suggests a strong negative attitude towards the migration crisis because “invasion is growing”.

As for the negative image of Islam, it is explicitly mentioned only in Žižková’s song “Breathe, Europe” (“…Islamic burkas, Jihad pulling the strings …”); however, all the texts express implicitly a deep concern about contemporary immigration from countries with a predominantly Muslim population.

As for the negative image of refugees or immigrants who might be – reading between the lines – considered mostly as Muslims, the strongest condemnation could be found in the song “Breathe, Europe”, in which Žižková warns that “Their task is to go on a bloody trip”, and appeals to people to mobilize at a European level: “Let’s reverse it, the animals have to go home”.

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Myslivcová points at the threat posed by Islamicization, which will demand a drastic change in our lifestyle: “I don’t want to go out covered in a robe and scarf/why change my pink traditions because of someone else?” Similarly, Jarek Nohavica focuses in the song “Baraba is touching my woman” on an Arab, “Alibaba from Syria”, who is a woman-chaser (“is touching my woman”), and he suggests – apparently hyperbolically – that he is gonna kill the Baraba, the Baraba, Alibaba, if he doesn’t kill me first.

Notes
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Sacralizing Nation and State and “Stopping Islamicization”

Konrad Pędziwiatr, PhD (Cracow University of Economics, Poland)
The 100th anniversary of Fatima and 300 years since the coronation of the highly venerated Black Madonna of Czestochowa were celebrated in Poland on 7 October 2017 with a mass religious event called “Rosary to the Borders”. [1] This day also marked the anniversary of the Christian victory over Ottoman Turks in the sea battle of Lepanto in 1571. The last anniversary was played down by some organizers of the event and stressed by others. Lay Catholics from the organization Soli Deo Basta, who had put forward the idea of “Rosary to the Borders”, encouraged Poles to go to designated points along the country’s borders for a mass rosary prayer and thus celebrate the double (triple?) anniversary. The liturgical commission of the Polish Episcopal Conference (the central organ of the Catholic Church in Poland) gave official approval to the programme of events and encouraged the faithful to join the mass prayer and mobilized parishes to help in the planning and to offer liturgies for the participants. Numerous state companies provided financial support to the institution organizing the event. [2] According to the organizers, around a million Poles prayed for the “salvation of Poland, Europe and the world”. However, before the event began, some of its organizers and prospective participants spoke about other goals that the prayer had, such as protecting Poland and Europe from secularization and Islamicization.

From the beginning, there was a lack of clarity about the goals of the mobilization not only among the organizers [3] and participants [4] but also among the clergy. Although the spokesperson of the Episcopal Conference stressed that the event had a purely religious character, and that it was “a manipulation” to claim otherwise, [5] some of the statements made by members of the Conference contradicted this. For example, the Archbishop of Kraków, Marek Jędraszewski, said that the event on the nation’s borders is a message “to other European nations so that they understand that it’s necessary to return to Christian roots so that Europe may remain Europe […] it represents the only way to save its culture”. [6] In his view, the only way to stop the Islamicization of Europe is through the sacralization of the nation and state, and the re-Christianization of Europe. This perception is widely held not only among a significant section of the Polish clergy, but also by lay Catholics.

At the same time, many people accused the organizers and participants of contributing to the country’s growing malcontent with regard to various ‘others’ (especially from the Middle East and Africa), and of providing symbolic support to the current right-wing government and its policy of opposing the EU relocation and resettlement scheme. These voices could be heard not only outside the Church, but also within it. The former secretary of the Episcopal Conference, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, told the Italian newspaper Famiglia Cristiana that “The rosary is a beautiful prayer, but the bishops did not foresee or understand in time that it could be used as an ideological weapon in the government’s propaganda. […] The Church not noticing this amounted at the very least to very serious naivety”. [7]

The vagueness and contradictions of the statements about the goals of the Rosary to the Borders show the wider ambivalence of the Polish Catholic Church and some of its most active lay members when it comes to how they perceive “others”, and in particular Muslims. The aim of this paper is to shed light on some of the features of the involvement of Polish Catholicism in the public sphere in last years that contribute to the strengthening of the Polish fear of Muslims and Islam.

In order to understand the importance of the Polish Catholic Church in shaping the views of Poles on a range of subjects including Muslims and Islam, we need to be aware that Poland is a country where around 90% of people belong to the Catholic Church, with slightly less than half of these regularly participating in religious ser-
vices. Thus, the Church’s influence in the country goes far beyond the religious sphere. [8] The Church’s position in today’s Poland is anchored not only historically and culturally, but also legally, as the Church is the only religious institution whose relations with the state are regulated by an international treaty or concordat. [9] Through its teachings both within and outside the state educational system, [10] the Church plays an important role in regulating various matters traditionally linked to the private sphere, and therefore has a significant impact on the shape and content of public debates.

As public opinion polls show, these extra-religious roles that the Church plays are accepted by most of society. For instance, a study conducted by CBOS in 2013 showed that 80% (or more) of Poles did not object to the participation of clergy in ceremonies related to state holidays, and accepted Catholic crosses in secular public buildings, religious lessons in public schools, and the religious nature of military oaths. Furthermore, almost 75% did not see anything wrong in the participation of priests in television programmes, and 61% gave the clergy the right to speak publicly on spiritual and moral issues. The fact that a large majority of Poles did not want the clergy to tell them whom they should vote for (only 15% said that they did) clearly shows the limits to the Church’s influence in the public sphere. [11] Nonetheless, social research shows that the Church is an institution that has a
great impact on public debates in Poland – not only spiritual, moral and philosophical debates, but also legal, economic and political.

One example of the Church’s impact on the content of public debates in Poland is the ban on large-scale Sunday shopping. Theoretically, this issue is an economic one and does not directly relate to religious life. Nonetheless, the clergy became one of the initiators of a discussion on the issue, and successfully lobbied for new regulations in this domain. The position of individual priests and bishops on this matter was significantly strengthened when the Polish Episcopal Conference officially stated that it supported the ban on Sunday shopping. [12] The authors of the new legal regulations in this domain frequently referred to the Church’s position and the social teachings of the Catholic Church as arguments in the political debate, thereby prioritizing religious over economic arguments. In doing so, they were well aware of surveys that showed that 60% of Poles had a positive attitude to the reforms in this domain. [13]

The Catholic Church is also one of the most trusted institutions in the country and the one that receives the highest social evaluation rates for its activism. In recent studies, 52% of respondents viewed the Church’s activism in 2017 positively, and 35% viewed it negatively. Although the Church’s evaluations are quite stable in this regard (see Graph 1 below), we may notice

![Graph 1](image-url)

**Graph 1.** Social evaluation of the Polish Catholic Church’s activism between 2011 and 2017. (CBOS 2017).

Legend: In blue - positive evaluations and in red – negative evaluations.
that in 2015 there began a temporary decline in the positive evaluations of the Church's activism and an increase in the number of people who see this activism in a negative light. [14]

One explanation for the declining positive social evaluations of the work of the Church in Poland may be related to its increasing politicization over the last few years and its increasing alliance with the right-wing government that came to power in 2015. The Polish Catholic Church is politically divided, with its more open, centrist and pro-European elements frequently sympathizing with the former ruling party, the centre-right Civic Platform, while its more conservative and anti-EU elements tending to support the right-wing Law and Justice Party. [15] The Party's rise to power significantly strengthened the latter elements. The new ruling party has "repaid" the Church for its silent support of a wide range of reforms introduced under the slogan of "good change" by banning Sunday shopping, suspending in-vitro programmes, limiting access to medical contraception, eliminating sexual education from school curricula, and giving the Church more influence in the state-owned media and in the new school curricula. [16]

The Church has benefitted from this new political alliance as many of its ideas and suggestions either were implemented immediately or are being prepared for implementation by the governing party (e.g. further restrictions on abortion). At the same time, the Church's more aggressive intrusion into various spheres of life in alliance with the Law and Justice Party is clearly viewed by a growing number of Poles as transgressing the limits of its socially acceptable influence.

The new alliance between some elements of the Church and the government has also significantly intensified the processes of sacralization of nation and state. [17] As Michał Buchowski notes, there is a strong intertwining of Catholicism and nationalism in Poland: there are crosses in almost every school and in many other public spaces, religious classes in state schools, numerous religious monuments, the presentation of national heroes as religious martyrs, religiously motivated laws on abortion. [18] In these processes of mixing Catholicism and nationalism, the Polish nation is constructed as a hybrid of the sacred and the profane. In a new political context (locally and globally), a profane nation/state is converted into a holy body of a nation/state that is endangered not only by cultural, but also (and above all) by religious, Others. Within this context, Islam and Muslims have been constructed as the most significant threat to the nation and the state. The figure of a refugee has been constructed to embody Muslims and Islam [19]. Thus, opposition to the EU's proposed relocation and resettlement scheme from the end of 2015 gained a new religious dimension. Politicians of the ruling party, backed by their media outlets, have repeated the narrative that opposing (Muslim) refugees from the Middle East and Africa equates to saying "no" to the Islamicization of Europe and to supposedly its inevitable side effects in the form of terrorist attacks.

These views found many sympathizers among the conservative and anti-European elements of the Polish Catholic Church. Numerous bishops representing this section of the Church expressed not only reservations concerning accepting refugees from the Muslim world, but also strong objections – thereby challenging directions from the Holy See. In the most extreme version, a young charismatic Catholic priest, Jacek Międlar, claimed in 2015 and 2016 that the threat of Islamicization was imminent. He was suspended by his religious order (Zgromadzenie Księży Misjonarzy) for spreading openly anti-Semitic and Islamophobic views, and then announced his departure from the order in September 2016. He became a symbol of the marriage of the most extreme elements of Polish Catholicism and far-right movements (Wszechpolski and ONR), and especially so after leading a Holy Mass and delivering a sermon in Białystok Cathedral in which he supported the far-right organisation ONR. [20] During the nationalist rally on Independence Day (11 November) in 2015, he addressed the crowd by saying:

Dearly beloved, we're not afraid of the peaceful Muslims, but they're a minority. We're afraid of fundamentalism. We do not want violence, we do not want aggression in the name of Allah [...] We must oppose it. We do not want the hatred that is in the Quran, but we want the love and truth of the Gospel. We want to fight with the sword of love and truth, to which Saint Paul the Apostle calls us in the sixth chapter [of the Epistle] to the Ephesians [6:14–17]. The Gospel, and not the Quran!!! The Gospel, and not the Quran!!!! [21]
Research that I have carried in religious seminaries (including the one attended by Międlar, n=162) shows that fear of the Muslim other is quite widespread among future Polish priests. Their views on Muslims, refugees and the social diversity resulting from migration are much more in line with the views of most Poles (very apprehensive) and with the current political establishment than they are with the Pope’s position and the messages of the Holy See. My research has also shown that future Polish priests are characterized by high levels of fear of the other (in particular, the Muslim other) and xenophobia, as well as by little tolerance for widely understood ethno-religious diversity. [22]

The new alliance between the Church and state in Poland continues to sacralize nation and state, and to portray migrants from the Muslim world as a key threat to the nation and state. One key moment in this process occurred during the Independence Day rally organized under the banner “We Want God” on 11 November 2017. As one of the organizers explained to the media, they had chosen the theme to “invoke the fighting church” and to “portray Catholicism not as a faith of the weak but as a faith of strong people”. [23] This latest episode in the sacralization of nation and state also overlapped with the manifestation of sympathy for xenophobic or white-supremacist ideas among participants in the rally co-organized by the far-right organizations National-Radical Camp (ONR), the National Movement (RN), and the All Polish Youth (MW), which traced their roots back to antisemitic groups that had been active before the Second World War. One banner read, “White Europe of brotherly nations”. [24] When asked by journalists about this and many other xenophobic banners carried during the march, the then Minister of Interior Affairs, Mariusz Błaszczak, said that he “had not seen them”, [25] thereby trivializing the hate speech and legitimizing xenophobia once again.

Notes
[1] For more information on the event, see the official website http://rozaniecdogranic.pl/.
[4] For example, one participant interviewed by the BBC said that, by participating in the event, she was expressing her gratitude that her son had survived a car crash, but also praying for the survival of Christianity in Europe. “Islam wants to destroy Europe. […] They want to turn us away from Christianity”. BBC, Poland holds controversial prayer day, “BBC News”, 7 October 2017, sec. Europe, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41538260.
[6] Ibid.
[10] Religious education was re-introduced in state schools in 1990.


[15] For more on the conservative part of the Church that is often associated with the social movement formed around the radio station Mary, see K. Pędziwiatr, Church and State Relations in Poland with a Special Focus on the Radio Station Mary, [in:] Religion, Politics and Nation-Building in the Post-Communist Countries, ed. by D. Westerlund and G. Simons, Ashgate, London 2015, pp. 163–178.


[17] It is important to stress that this process has a very long history; see, for example, Maria Janion, Niesamowita Słowiańszczyzna (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2006) and Michał Łuczewski, Odwieczny naród. Polak i katolik w Zmięcej (Toruń: Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej, 2012).


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